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ABSTRACT
NING FU: When the Honeymoon is Over:
The Effects of Family Structure
on Children’s Cognitive and Non-cognitive Achievements.
(Under the direction of Donna B. Gilleskie)
This dissertation examines the effects of family structure on children’s cognitive and non-
cognitive achievements, using data on females and their children from the 1979 cohort of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. To deal with dynamic selection into married, cohabiting
or single households, I model women’s relationship status, school enrollment, employment, family
size, and investment in children over the life cycle. All of these behaviors, and the production of
children’s achievements, are estimated using a random effects joint estimation procedure, which
allows the unobserved heterogeneity of the woman and her children to influence both maternal be-
haviors and children’s outcomes. I find that, compared to growing up in single households, being
born and raised in married households significantly decreases children’s behavioral problems by
0.17 to 0.28 standard deviations, depending on the child’s age and gender. These gains are ex-
hibited by children under age ten. Moreover, compared to being raised in cohabiting households,
growing up in continuously married households decreases girls’ behavioral problems by 0.4 stan-
dard deviations, during ages four to six. In addition to measuring causal marginal effects of family
structure, this dissertation uses simulation to evaluate how various policy interventions, including
marriage promotion, maternal education promotion, and parenting skills training, could potentially
impact children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements differently.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The United States has experienced dramatic changes in family structure since the 1960s. In
2014, over 40 percent of births were to unmarried women, up from only 5.3 percent in 1960.1
Data indicate that children growing up in single or cohabiting households have less education,
worse health outcomes, and lower future marriage and socioeconomic prospects (e.g., McLanahan
and Sandefur, 1994; Buchanan, Maccoby, and Dornbusch, 1996; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001;
Manning and Lamb, 2003; Brown, 2004; Amato, 2005). Intended to reduce single parenthood and
improve children’s welfare, the federal government has been providing $150 million each year
since 2005 to support the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Initiative based, in part,
on these observed correlations. However, in order to design effective evidence-based policy, it
is essential to realize that the frequently-cited correlations between non-marital parenthood and
children’s adverse outcomes do not necessarily imply a causal relationship. Using the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, this dissertation measures the causal impacts of family struc-
ture on school-aged children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements.2
With the goal of uncovering causal relationships, this dissertation develops and estimates a
dynamic, multiple-equation model to explain women’s simultaneous behaviors over the life cycle
regarding their relationship status, school enrollment, employment, family size and investment in
children, and to empirically evaluate how the observed behaviors influence children’s cognitive and
non-cognitive achievements. When making decisions each period, women take into account their
histories of relationships, schooling, employment, family size, and children’s past achievements.
1Statistics are from Child Trends Data Bank (2015).
2This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The views expressed
here do not necessarily reflect the views of the BLS.
Their behaviors are also affected by demographic characteristics of the household and the time-
varying state and local environment. These decisions could change across periods as circumstances
evolve, such as the accumulation of work experience, aging of the woman and her children, or
fluctuations in local unemployment rates. A woman’s behaviors, her child’s past cognitive and
non-cognitive achievements, and the unobserved characteristics of the mother and of the child
jointly determine each child’s achievements in each period.
Compared with the existing literature that explores causal effects of family structure on chil-
dren’s outcomes, this dissertation stands out in three ways. First, it establishes the unbiased causal
impacts of family structure on children’s achievements, while jointly considering other life-cycle
decisions, such as employment and fertility, all of which could impact children’s achievements.
Current causal studies focus on the endogeneity of only one behavior, namely family structure,
treating related behaviors as exogenous. Failing to model jointly-made decisions that may be cor-
related with unobservables may produce biased effects of family structure on children’s achieve-
ments. In this dissertation, I jointly model the dynamics of relationship status, as well as other
major life-cycle behaviors and children’s achievements, allowing all these dynamic behaviors and
outcomes to influence each other, as well as be influenced by exogenous characteristics, unob-
served correlated heterogeneity and random shocks.
Second, this dissertation examines the impacts of family structure on children who have never
experienced family structure changes. The fixed-effects approach, which is commonly used in
the literature to address the endogeneity of family structure, relies on either differences in family
structure experience across siblings in the same household (i.e., the household fixed effects), or
changes in family structure a child experiences over time (i.e., the child fixed effects). The effects
identified from such transition households cannot be used to infer the effects of family structure
on children who are born and raised in always single/cohabiting/married households. The joint
estimation approach used in this dissertation enables me to identify and compare the latter effects.
Specifically, I find that, compared to growing up in continuously single households, being born and
raised in continuously married households significantly decreases children’s behavioral problems
2
by 0.17 to 0.28 standard deviations, depending on the child’s age and gender. These beneficial im-
pacts are statistically significant for children under age 10. Moreover, compared to being raised in
cohabiting households, growing up in continuously married households decreases girls’ behavioral
problems by 0.4 standard deviations, during ages 4 to 6.
Third, I evaluate the potential impacts of alternative policy interventions that aim to change
different aspects of women’s behaviors, and I establish bounds for such effects. The literature on
the production of children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements has explored the impacts
of existing policies or natural experiments. However, without modeling individuals’ dynamic be-
haviors, these papers are not equipped to examine how children’s outcomes would differ under
alternative intervention scenarios. For example, if a marriage intervention program does not af-
fect participants’ propensity to get married, policy evaluation studies cannot infer how children’s
achievements would have changed if the program was effective in changing marriage rates. In
addition, evaluations of a marriage intervention program are not able to answer broader questions
about the potential impacts of an intervention on the target population that improves a mother’s
education level instead of promoting marriage. Through estimation and simulation of channels of
influence on children’s outcomes, this dissertation can answer both types of questions. Specifically,
I find that effective marriage promotion programs have the potential to produce small, favorable
impacts on children’s behavioral problems for initially single households. Interventions that suc-
cessfully encourage unmarried mothers to continue their education and interventions that increase
parental investment could benefit children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements.
3
CHAPTER 2
RELATED LITERATURE
2.1 Family Structure is Not Random
The difficulty in measuring the effects of family structure on children’s outcomes stems from
the nonrandomness of family structure. Specifically, observed and unobserved characteristics of
the parent(s) and of the child may be correlated with both the observed family structure and the
child outcomes. Researchers have used two approaches to address this endogeneity of family
structure. The first approach uses within-family (across siblings) or within-child (at different ages)
fixed effects (Aughinbaugh, Pierret, and Rothstein, 2005; Gennetian, 2005; Bjo¨rklund, Ginther,
and Sundstro¨m, 2007; Cooper, Osborne, Beck, and McLanahan, 2011). It is worth noting that
the fixed-effect approach can only eliminate invariant unobserved characteristics. It fails to cap-
ture time-varying determinants that jointly influence family structure and child achievements. For
example, suppose a mother recently lost her job. On the one hand, this event could worsen the
relationship with her husband and eventually lead to a divorce and, on the other hand, it could neg-
atively impact her child’s achievements since she might alter investment in the child due to the job
loss. Fixed-effects analysis would fail to capture the changes in employment and parental invest-
ments (if not modeled), and lead to the potentially incorrect conclusion that the family structure
change causally decreases children’s achievements. In this dissertation, several mechanisms are
jointly modeled as endogenous dynamic life-cycle behaviors that may affect child development.
These include relationship, schooling, employment, family size, and investment in children.
The second approach that has been used in the literature to address the potentially nonran-
dom nature of family structure includes families that experience a parental death to serve as an
exogenous source of family dissolution (Francesconi, Jenkins, and Siedler, 2005). However, the
assumption that a parental death is exogenous to other child development inputs or child develop-
ment itself is questionable. As McLanahan, Tach, and Schneider (2013) point out, deaths related to
violence or accidents may reflect selection into risky behaviors, and illness-related deaths may re-
flect selection into particular lifestyles (such as smoking and drinking) or genetic endowment that
may also affect child outcomes. Biblarz and Gottainer (2000), for example, find that, compared
with children raised in single-mother families created by the death of the father, children raised in
divorced single-mother families have significantly lower levels of education, occupational status,
and happiness in adulthood. Corak (2001) finds that, relative to children from intact families, chil-
dren whose parents divorced postpone marriage and they are more likely to suffer separation or
divorce once married. Children from bereaved families, on the other hand, are no different in their
marital behavior than those from intact families. As such, the measured effect of parental disso-
lution associated with a parental death cannot be expanded to that of divorced or selected single
parenthood.
To better understand why and how family structure is determined, a number of studies use
dynamic structural models to explicitly model the decision making process of forward-looking
individuals with regard to marriage, cohabitation and divorce, along with other life-cycle decisions
such as employment and schooling (Brien, Lillard, and Stern, 2006; Keane and Wolpin, 2010;
Laufer and Gemici, 2011; Blau and van der Klaauw, 2013; Flabbi and Flinn, 2015). These papers
provide a theoretical framework to make explicit how different life-cycle decisions are correlated
and jointly determined, and to derive the demand functions used in this dissertation. Given the
focus on children’s outcomes, this dissertation includes parental investment as an endogenous time-
varying behavior that is not commonly modeled in this literature. It also allows a woman’s behavior
to be influenced by her children’s past cognitive and non-cognitive achievements.
2.2 Production of Children’s Cognitive and Non-cognitive Achievements
This dissertation relates to the literature on the production of school-aged children’s cognitive
and non-cognitive achievements. Two types of parameters are the focus of empirical work in this
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literature: the policy effect and the productive effects of inputs.1 The policy effect identifies the
average or total effect of an intervention on achievements without controlling for other possible
inputs. This effect is estimated using experiments such as the Tennessee Student/Teacher Achieve-
ment Ratio (STAR) experiment (Finn and Achilles, 1990; Mosteller, 1995; Krueger, 1998, 2003;
Fryer, Levitt, and List, 2015; Mayer, Kalil, Oreopoulos, and Gallegos, 2015), or natural experi-
ments such as welfare reform and state-level policy changes (e.g., Bernal and Keane, 2011; Juhn,
Rubinstein, and Zuppann, 2015). The productive effects, on the other hand, measure the impact of
each input on child’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements, holding all other inputs constant
(Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007; Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Bernal, 2008; Gayle, Golan,
and Soytas, 2011; Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall, 2014; Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix, 2015). Bernal
(2008) focuses on a sample of married women and finds that the effects of maternal employment
and child care on children’s cognitive achievements are negative and sizable. Del Boca et al. (2014)
also focus on investment decisions in intact families, and they find that both parents’ time inputs
are important for the cognitive development of their children, while the monetary inputs are not as
important. Using data from India, Attanasio et al. (2015) find that goods investment is effective in
improving children’s cognition at all stages of childhood. Gayle et al. (2011) model the decisions
of fertility, employment and time investment into children for single families and married fami-
lies separately, and estimate that paternal time investment increases their children’s probability of
graduating from high school and getting some college education while maternal time increases the
probability of achieving a college degree. These existing empirical analyses of children’s achieve-
ment production functions emphasize the importance of parental behavioral inputs on children’s
development. However, they do not model the family structure dynamics as an endogenous input
itself (e.g., presence of a male parental figure) or as a modifier of productive inputs (e.g., restric-
tions on TV time or enforcement of study time may have different effects as the number of adults
in the household varies). By 1) modeling the production function of children’s achievements that
allows family structure to affect both the level of children’s achievements and the productivity of
1Todd and Wolpin (2003) discuss the two types of parameters in detail.
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other inputs, and 2) using policy and price variations as exclusion restrictions for women’s behav-
iors, this dissertation is able to examine the productive effect of family structure and evaluate the
mechanisms of various policy effects.
This dissertation is also closely related to the discussion on the static and dynamic complemen-
tarity of parental investments, and the self-productivity of skills (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and
Masterov, 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010; Aizer
and Cunha, 2012). Theoretical and empirical evidence have shown that parents invest more in chil-
dren with higher endowments due to the complementarity between endowments and investments
(static complementarity), and parental investments and existing human capital are complements in
the production of later human capital (dynamic complementarity). Cunha and Heckman (2008)
also provide support for the skill self-productivity. They find that non-cognitive skills promote
the formation of cognitive skills, but cognitive skills in general do not promote the formation of
non-cognitive skills. This dissertation is able to provide empirical support for the existence of
complementarity and self-productivity in the production of children’s achievements.
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CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The dynamic empirical model is motivated by a theoretical structural framework in which a
forward-looking woman makes per-period (annual) decisions about her relationship status, school
enrollment, employment, family size, and investment in children to maximize her lifetime utility.
Her decisions jointly influence her children’s outcomes over time. In the empirical estimation,
I approximate the choice probabilities as functions of information known to the woman at the
beginning of each period. This information includes the woman’s past behavior histories and her
children’s previous achievements, as well as their demographic characteristics and the current state
and local policy environment. I jointly estimate these demand equations with child achievement
production functions, allowing for correlation through both mother-level and child-level observed
and unobserved heterogeneity. I estimate the correlated unobserved heterogeneity components as
random effects whose distributions are approximated as discrete and are estimated by the data
(i.e., no assumptions on functional form). I also address econometric considerations such as the
non-randomness of survey attrition and initial conditions.
3.1 Timing and Notation
A woman enters each period t with an observed information set, Ωt, which includes the his-
tories of her relationships, Mt−1; of school enrollment, St−1; of employment, Et−1; of children
in the household, Kt−1; and of her children’s cognitive achievements, Act−1, and non-cognitive
achievements, Ant−1, observed at the end of period t − 1. This information set also includes ex-
ogenous characteristics of her and her children, Xt, and the state or county-level price and supply
conditions, Pt, observed at the point of decision-making. This vector of information known at the
beginning of period t is denoted Ωt = (Mt−1, St−1, Et−1, Kt−1, Act−1, A
n
t−1, Xt, Pt). The relation-
ship history vector, Mt−1, contains the woman’s relationship status last period mt−1, the duration
of the relationship up to period t and the number of times she has been married up to period t. The
woman’s education history vector, St−1, includes her school enrollment status last period, st−1, and
her highest grade completed up to period t. Her employment status last period, et−1 and her work
experience up to period t make up the employment history Et−1. The family size vector, Kt−1,
indicates whether the number of children in the household changed in the last period, kt−1, and the
number of children under and above age five in the household up to period t. Children’s cogni-
tive achievements, Act−1, is a vector of each child’s cognitive achievement in t − 1, {Act−1,j}Kt−1j=1 .
Similarly, children’s non-cognitive achievements, Ant−1, is a vector of each child’s non-cognitive
achievement in t − 1, {Ant−1,j}Kt−1j=1 . The exogenous variables, Xt, include the mother’s charac-
teristics (such as age, race, AFQT score), children’s characteristics (such as age, race, gender),
and calendar year trends. Lastly, the state and local policy environment is denoted by the vector
Pt = (P
M
t , P
S
t , P
E
t , P
K
t , P
I
t , P
A
t ). Different superscripts indicate the variables in Pt that relate to
particular endogenous behaviors and outcomes; namely, cost or supply-side variables that affect
relationship status, PMt ; parental school enrollment, P
S
t ; employment, P
E
t ; family size, P
K
t ; and
investment in children, P It . The vector also contains variables that capture average characteristics
of local schools, PAt .
Figure 3.1 depicts the per-period elements of an individual’s decision-making process with
regard to timing and observability. At the beginning of a period t, a woman draws an hourly
wage offer of her own, w∗t , and an income of her potential spouse/partner, I
P∗
t , both of which are
unobserved by the econometrician. She then jointly decides 1) whether to be married, cohabiting
or single, mt, 2) whether to enroll in school, st, 3) whether to be employed or not, and whether to
work full-time/part-time and full-year/part-year if working at all, et, 4) whether or not to change
the number of children living in the household, kt, and 5) how much to invest in each child j, it,j .
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Figure 3.1: Timeline
Beginning of t
Information set:
Ωt = (Mt−1, St−1, Et−1,
Kt−1, Act−1, A
n
t−1, Xt, Pt)
Individual observes:
draws of wage w∗t ,
partner income IP∗t
Individual chooses:
period t behaviors
mt,st,et,kt,
{
it,j
}Kt+kt
j=1
Econometrician observes:
wt if working
IPt if in relationship
Stochasitc
child achievements
revealed: {Act , Ant }
Beginning of t+ 1
Updated information set:
Ωt+1 = (Mt, St, Et,
Kt, A
c
t , A
n
t , Xt+1, Pt+1)
Each period, a woman chooses her period t behaviors, mt,st,et,kt,
{
it,j
}Kt+kt
j=1
, where each be-
havior may include several alternatives. That is, for relationship status (mt = m), the alternative
set is:
m =

0, to be in marriage
1, to be in cohabitation
2, to be single .
If the woman is in a relationship, the econometrician observes her spouse/partner’s income IPt =
IP∗t . The school enrollment (st = s) alternatives are:
s =

0, to not enroll
1, to enroll .
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The employment (et = e) alternatives are:
e =

0, to work full-year full-time
1, to work full-year part-time
2, to work part-year full-time
3, to work part-year part-time
4, to be unemployed
5, to be out of labor force .
If the woman works, the econometrician observes her wage wt = w∗t . The change in the number of
children in the household, kt, can be any integer, where positive values could be due to childbirth,
child adoption, or marriage to a partner who already has children, and negative values could reflect
child mortality, that children are sent to foster care or to their grandparents, loss of custody after
divorce, or that children are old enough to leave the household. I let kt = 0 indicate no change in
the number of children in year t, and kt = 1 and kt = −1 indicate an increase and a decrease in
the number of children, respectively, in year t. That is,
k =

−1, increase the number of children
0, no change in the number of children
1, decrease the number of children .
Lastly, the parental investment for child j, it,j , is a continuous variable. As the data section explains
in detail, parental investment is not in terms of dollars or hours exclusively. Instead, it is an overall
measure of the cognitive stimulation and emotional support provided by the household. All these
behaviors impact the cognitive and non-cognitive achievements of each child j, Act,j and A
n
t,j ,
respectively, which are realized at the end of the period.
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3.2 Estimable Structural Equations and Production Functions
The derived demand for each behavior in period t is specified as a function of the information
set coming into period t, Ωt, and the structural or primitive parameters of the individuals’ utility
function and the child achievement production function. We approximate these highly non-linear
functions using an nth-order Taylor series approximation to define choice probabilities that are
functions of endogenous and exogenous variables known entering each period. These demand
equations and the production functions are correlated through both observable and unobservable
family characteristics. The additive error terms that capture the unobserved determinants of each
equation `, `t , are decomposed into three components: a mother endowment component, µ; a child
j endowment component, νj; and an idiosyncratic component, ε`t , where 
`
t = ρ
`µ + ω`νj + ε
`
t .
The factor loadings, ρ` and ω`, on each non-idiosyncratic components of heterogeneity, µ and νj ,
are denoted with equation-specific superscripts, and indicate the relative importance of the asso-
ciated heterogeneity in each equation. They also vary by outcome for behaviors with more than
two alternatives. The equation-specific idiosyncratic terms ε`t are assumed to be Type-I Extreme
Value distributed for discrete behaviors mt, et, st and kt, thus implying logit and multinomial logit
probabilities that enter the likelihood function. They are i.i.d. normally distributed for the continu-
ous investment behaviors, it; expected wages, wt; spouse/partner incomes, IPt ; and the continuous
cognitive achievement, Act,j and non-cognitive achievement, A
n
t,j . I allow the unobserved hetero-
geneity components to be approximated by discrete step-wise functions (see Heckman and Singer,
1984; Mroz and Guilkey, 1992; Mroz, 1999) rather than imposing a distributional form (such as
normality).1
An individual’s contributions to the likelihood function include probabilities of her observed
discrete behaviors and densities of the observed parental investment, her wage and her spouse/partner’s
income, and her children’s achievement outcomes. The probabilities of being single (mt = 2) or
1Using Monte Carlo analysis, Mroz (1999) finds that when the true distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is
normal, there is little bias or efficiency loss by assuming a discrete factor random effects model. Moreover, when the
unobserved heterogeneity is not normally distributed, the discrete factor approximations perform better than maximum
likelihood estimators that incorrectly assume joint normality.
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cohabiting (mt = 1) relative to being married (mt = 0) in period t are (in log odds):
ln
[p(mt = m)
p(mt = 0)
]
= fM(Mt−1, St−1, Et−1, Kt−1, At−1, Xt, Pt) + ρMmµ m = 1, 2. (3.1)
The linear functions f ` for behavior ` has as its arguments the pre-determined or endogenous
variables, exogenous characteristics and state and local supply-side variables that may be interacted
in the fully specified equations.
The probability of being enrolled in school (st = 1) relative to not enrolled (st = 0) in period
t is (in log odds):
ln
[p(st = 1)
p(st = 0)
]
= fS(Mt−1, St−1, Et−1, Kt−1, At−1, Xt, Pt) + ρSµ . (3.2)
The probabilities of working full-year part-time (et = 1), working part-year full-time (et = 2),
working part-year part-time (et = 3), being unemployed (et = 4), or being out of labor force
(et = 5) relative to working full-year full-time (et = 0) in period t are (in log odds):
ln
[p(et = e)
p(et = 0)
]
= fE(Mt−1, St−1, Et−1, Kt−1, At−1, Xt, Pt) + ρEe µ e = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. (3.3)
The probabilities of a change in the number of children in the household relative to no change in
the number of children (kt = k) are (in log odds):
ln
[p(kt = k)
p(kt = 0)
]
= fK(Mt−1, St−1, Et−1, Kt−1, At−1, Xt, Pt) + ρKk µ k = −1, 1. (3.4)
where kt = 1 and kt = −1 indicate that at least one child is acquired or lost, respectively, in year
t. The continuously-valued investment in child j in period t is specified as:
it,j = f
I(Mt−1, St−1, Et−1, Kt−1, At−1,j, Xt, Pt) + ρIµ+ ωIνj + εIt . (3.5)
where εIt is serially-uncorrelated and follows a normal distribution.
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Modeled jointly with selection into employment, I estimate an equation for log wages using
a woman’s observed wage in period t conditional on being employed. The log mean of the wage
distribution is a linear function of her relationship history, Mt−1; the family size history, Kt−1;
her education experience, St−1; work experience, Et−1; demographic characteristics, Xt; the local
employment situation, PEt ; her unobserved heterogeneity, µ, and an i.i.d. disturbance term ε
W
t :
ln(wt|et ≤ 3) = fW (Mt−1, St−1, Et−1, Kt−1, Xt, PEt ) + ρWµ+ εWt . (3.6)
Similarly, I model a woman’s spouse/partner’s observed income in period t, conditional on the
woman being in a relationship, as a linear function of the same observed and unobserved char-
acteristics and an i.i.d. disturbance term εPt . The log mean of the partner’s income distribution
is:
ln(IPt |mt 6= 2) = fP (Mt−1, St−1, Et−1, Kt−1, Xt, PEt ) + ρPµ+ εPt . (3.7)
The production function for child j’s cognitive achievement at the end of period t, Act,j , follows
the value-added specification, and is a linear function of her previous cognitive and non-cognitive
achievements coming into period t, namely Act−1,j and A
n
t−1,j; the mother’s current period invest-
ment in the child, it,j; relationship, mt; schooling, st; employment, et; and family size change,
kt; the state and local school characteristics, PAt ; and both the family-level (µ) and child-specific
(νj) unobserved heterogeneity, respectively. The random disturbance term, εCt , such as a health
shock to the child, might also impact child’s performance on the test, and is assumed to be i.i.d.
distributed. The estimable production function is:
Act,j = f
C(Act−1,j, A
n
t−1,j, it,j,mt, st, et, kt, Xt, P
A
t ) + ρ
Cµ+ ωCνj + ε
C
t . (3.8)
Similarly, child j’s non-cognitive achievement transition follows:
Ant,j = f
N(Ant−1,j, A
c
t−1,j, it,j,mt, st, et, kt, Xt, P
A
t ) + ρ
Nµ+ ωNνj + ε
N
t . (3.9)
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Note that the demand equations (3.1)-(3.5) are functions of the same explanatory variables because
behaviors are jointly made. The vector of state and local policy conditions Pt, which includes
(PMt , P
S
t , P
E
t , P
K
t , P
I
t , P
A
t ), enters into each demand equation to capture own- and cross-price
effects. These demand behaviors are jointly estimated with the wage equation (3.6) if the mother is
employed, the spouse/partner’s income equation (3.7) if the mother is not single, and each child’s
cognitive and non-cognitive achievement production functions (3.8) and (3.9). The unobserved
determinants of each equation are correlated through common family-specific and child-specific
unobserved heterogeneity terms.
3.3 Attrition and Initial Condition Equations
In order to take into account nonrandom sample attrition, I include an equation for the prob-
ability of attrition at the end of each period t that is jointly estimated with equations (3.1)-(3.9).
The probability of attrition at the end of period t depends on the updated information set, which
accounts for period t behaviors and outcomes, as well as the unobserved heterogeneity determi-
nants. I also include equations that model the missingness of a woman’s wages if she works, and
the missingness of the income of her spouse/partner, if she is in a relationship.
Since the initially-observed cognitive and non-cognitive achievements of the children do not
follow a value-added specification, I allow them to be a function of accumulated behaviors, ex-
ogenous characteristics of the household, and the mother and child unobserved heterogeneity. The
cognitive and non-cognitive achievements are first measured at age five and four, respectively. I
jointly estimate these initial condition equations with the set of dynamic demand and production
equations. Table 3.1 summarizes the jointly estimated set of 14 equations and their determinants.
The first column of Table 3.1 lists all the dependent variables of the system of equations, and
columns 2-4 contain the explanatory variables for each equation, including the pre-determined en-
dogenous variables, exogenous variables and unobserved heterogeneity. The probabilities formed
by each of the equations all enter into the likelihood function below.
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Table 3.1: Specification Summary for Jointly Estimated Set of Equations
Outcome Explanatory Variables
Pre-determined Endogenous Exogenous Unobs’d Het
Behaviors
Relationship Status mt Mt−1, St−1, Et−1,Kt−1, Act−1, Ant−1 Xt, PMt , PSt , PEt , PKt , P It , PAt µ, ε
M
t
Enrolled st Mt−1, St−1, Et−1,Kt−1, Act−1, Ant−1 Xt, PMt , PSt , PEt , PKt , P It , PAt µ, ε
S
t
Employed et Mt−1, St−1, Et−1,Kt−1, Act−1, Ant−1 Xt, PMt , PSt , PEt , PKt , P It , PAt µ, ε
E
t
∆ Children kt Mt−1, St−1, Et−1,Kt−1, Act−1, Ant−1 Xt, PMt , PSt , PEt , PKt , P It , PAt µ, ε
K
t
Investment in child j it,j Mt−1, St−1, Et−1,Kt−1, Act−1, Ant−1 Xt, PMt , PSt , PEt , PKt , P It , PAt µ, νj, ε
I
t
Distributions
Wage wt Mt−1, St−1, Et−1,Kt−1, Act−1, Ant−1 Xt, PEt µ, ε
W
t
if employed
Partner income IPt Mt−1, St−1, Et−1,Kt−1, Act−1, Ant−1 Xt, PEt µ, ε
P
t
if in a relationship
Achievements
Child math score Act,j mt, st, et, kt, it,j, A
c
t−1,j, A
n
t−1,j Xt, P
A
t µ, νj, εCt
Child behavior score Ant,j mt, st, et, kt, it,j, A
c
t−1,j, A
n
t−1,j Xt, P
A
t µ, νj, εNt
Initial Conditions
Initially observed Mt, St, Et,Kt, It Xt, PAt µ, νj, εiCt
math score Ac0t,j
Initial observed Mt, St, Et,Kt, It Xt, PAt µ, νj, εiNt
behavior score An0t,j
Other
Attrition att Mt, St, Et,Kt, Act , Ant Xt µ, εAt
Wage missing if emp wmt Xt µ, εwMt
Partner income missing pmt Xt µ, ε
pM
t
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3.4 Likelihood Function
The unconditional likelihood function for woman z is given by:
Q∑
q=1
θq
{{ T∏
t=1
[( 2∑
m=0
p(mzt = m|Ωzt, µq)1(mzt = m)
)( 1∑
s=0
p(szt = s|Ωzt, µq)1(szt = s)
)
×
( 5∑
e=0
p(ezt = e|Ωzt, µq)1(ezt = e)
)( 1∑
k=−1
p(kzt = k|Ωzt, µq)1(kzt = k)
)
×
( 1∑
a=0
p(atzt = a|Ωzt, µq)1(atzt = a)
)( 1∑
b=0
p(wmzt = b|Ωzt, µq)1(wmzt = b)
)
×
( 1∑
c=0
p(pmzt = c|Ωzt, µq)1(pmzt = c)
)
× φW (wzt|Ωzt, µq)1(ezt≤3)1(wmzt=0)φP (IPzt|Ωzt, µq)1(mzt 6=2)1(pmzt=0)
]}
×
{ J∏
j=1
R∑
r=1
δr
[
φA
c0
(Ac0ztj|Ωzt, µq, νr)φA
n0
(An0ztj|Ωzt, µq, νr)
]
1(j≤Kzt+kzt)
×
T∏
t=1
[
φI(iztj|Ωzt, µq, νr)φAc(Acztj|Ωzt, µq, νr)φAn(Anztj|Ωzt, µq, νr)
]
1(j≤Kzt+kzt)}}
(3.10)
where a woman z faces type q permanent heterogeneity, µq, with probability θq, and her child j
faces type r permanent heterogeneity, νr, with probability δr. pX(·) is the probability for behav-
ior/outcome X , if X is a discrete variable; φX(·) is the probability density for behavior/outcome
X , if X is a continuous variable. They are derived from the equations listed in Table 3.1. The
parameters of the likelihood function are estimated with full information maximum likelihood.
3.5 Identification
Identification of the causal effects of family structure on children’s achievements requires that
there are exogenous variables that are correlated with the joint behaviors, but do not have inde-
pendent impacts on children’s achievements other than through behavioral inputs. This exclusion
restriction requirement is satisfied by the timing assumption of the model, and the time-varying
state and local variables that represent the price and supply side conditions, such as local marriage
market characteristics, unemployment rates and college tuitions. Specifically, the identification is
achieved through two channels: a within-period channel and an across-period channel.
17
First, within each period t, women living in different states/counties may experience different
combinations of state and local environments. All of these state and local variables of period t, Pt,
enter into the behavior equations (3.1)-(3.5), as they may jointly influence women’s behaviors. But
conditional on the period t observed behaviors, only state and local factors that may affect chil-
dren’s achievements, namely those representing local school characteristics, enter into the child
achievement production equations. For example, local unemployment rates in period t may affect
a woman’s schooling and labor supply, but conditional on women’s schooling status, employment
status, and accumulated human capital stock in period t, these unemployment rates do not affect
their children’s achievements independently. Therefore, they are excluded from children’s achieve-
ment production functions, and serve as within-period exclusion restrictions.
Second, the identification also comes from across-period exclusion restrictions. Namely, even
women living in the same community in period t, may have different location histories, therefore
may have experienced varying state and local environments before period t. All these state and
local environments before period t have influenced women’s past endogenous behaviors, which in
turn affect their behaviors in period t. Again, conditioning on women’s behaviors in period t, these
past state and local environment variables do not have independent effects on children’s achieve-
ments in period t, therefore serving as additional exclusion restrictions. For example, the variation
in state-level average college tuitions in period t− 1 could affect women’s schooling status in pe-
riod t− 1, which then may influence women’s schooling status in period t - an input for children’s
achievement production functions in period t. Conditional on the women’s enrollment status in
period t, the variations of state-level average tuitions in t − 1 do not have an independent effect
on children’s achievements in period t. Therefore, they implicitly serve as across-period exclusion
restrictions for children’s achievement production functions in period t. In fact, all the state and
local environment variables before period t, serve such purpose. The exclusion restrictions used in
this dissertation have passed the overidentification test.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA
I use panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the
NLSY79 Children and Young Adults (NLSY79-CS). The NLSY79 is a nationally representative
sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14 to 22 years old when they were first sur-
veyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed annually through 1994 and are currently inter-
viewed on a biennial basis. In addition to demographic information such as gender, race, ethnicity,
and date of birth, the survey also provides detailed information on their relationship, employment,
and fertility at each wave. Starting from 1986, the NLSY79 began to interview all children born
to female NLSY79 respondents. For each child, the survey gathers information on measures of
children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements, as well as parental investment in each child.
My research sample includes women who have not attrited by 1986 and who were observed for
at least two consecutive periods (1986 and 1987). I exclude the military subsample, whose deci-
sion making process is likely to be different from the rest of the NLSY79 sample. I also excluded
the economically disadvantaged, nonblack/non-Hispanic subsample, which was discontinued from
1990. I follow 4,395 women and 8,579 children from 1986 to 2012 or until the first time they attrit-
ted from the NLSY79 survey. Table 4.1 shows the research sample size and attrition of adults by
year. The research sample contains 95,843 adult-year observations, and the attrition rate by wave is
generally below 5 percent. Tables 4.2 - 4.5 display descriptive statistics for the dependent variables,
endogenous explanatory variables, exogenous explanatory variables, and state/local environment
variables, respectively.
Table 4.1: Empirical Distribution of Research Sample
Year Sample Size Attriters Attrition Rate
1986 4395 – –
1987 4395 148 3.37
1988 4247 56 1.32
1989 4191 88 2.10
1990 4103 48 1.17
1991 4055 60 1.48
1992 3995 42 1.05
1993 3953 60 1.52
1994 3893 112 2.88
1995 3781 – –
1996 3781 116 3.07
1997 3665 – –
1998 3665 183 4.99
1999 3482 – –
2000 3482 178 5.11
2001 3304 – –
2002 3304 109 3.30
2003 3195 – –
2004 3195 100 3.13
2005 3095 – –
2006 3095 67 2.16
2007 3028 – –
2008 3028 99 3.27
2009 2929 – –
2010 2929 100 3.41
2011 2829 – –
2012 2829 – –
Number of person-year observations: 95,843
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Variable name Mean Std dev Min Max
Categorical dependent variables over all person-years
Relationship status at t
Single 0.377 0.485 0 1
Cohabiting 0.067 0.249 0 1
Married 0.556 0.497 0 1
Acquisition/loss of children at t
No change 0.884 0.320 0 1
Lose any children 0.052 0.223 0 1
Acquire any children 0.063 0.244 0 1
School enrollment at t 0.100 0.300 0 1
Employment at t
Full-year, full-time 0.575 0.494 0 1
Full-year, part-time 0.081 0.272 0 1
Part-year, full-time 0.106 0.307 0 1
Part-year, part-time 0.038 0.191 0 1
Unemployed 0.017 0.129 0 1
Out of labor force 0.185 0.388 0 1
Wage missing at t 0.035 0.183 0 1
Spouse/partner income missing at t 0.442 0.626 0 1
Attrition at t 0.024 0.152 0 1
Continuous dependent variables over all person-years
Investment in child: HOME percentile score 47.576 29.111 0 99
Hourly wage—employed 13.728 10.802 1 152
Spouse/partner income—partnered 44519.900 41398.200 1 1080241
Cognitive outcome: child PIAT math percentile score 52.982 27.936 1 99
Non-cognitive outcome: child behavioral problem percentile score 54.529 27.283 13 100
Initial condition: child PIAT math percentile score 49.759 27.400 1 99
Initial condition: child behavioral problem percentile score 55.692 27.619 12 100
Note: Dollar amounts are in year 2000 dollars.
21
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Endogenous Individual Explanatory Variables
Variable name Mean Std dev Min Max
Endogenous individual variables over all person-years
Relationship history
Married in t-1 0.550 0.498 0 1
Years married entering t if married in t-1 11.411 7.808 1 41
More than one marriage entering t 0.186 0.389 0 1
Cohabited in t-1 0.067 0.249 0 1
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 4.203 4.160 1 27
Single in t-1 0.383 0.486 0 1
Years newly single entering t if single in t-1 7.084 6.104 1 40
First-year becoming single in t if previously partnered in t-1 0.030 0.171 0 1
Child history
Acquire any children in t-1 0.070 0.250 0 1
Lose any children in t-1 0.048 0.214 0 1
Number of children aged less than five entering t 0.247 0.520 0 4
Number of children aged greater than or equal to five entering t 0.877 1.030 0 5
Child’s father non-biological in t 0.046 0.210 0 1
Child PIAT math percentile score entering t 52.173 26.702 1 99
Average PIAT math percentile score of all kids in HH entering t 0.532 0.243 0.01 0.99
Lowest PIAT math percentile score of all kids in HH entering t 0.474 0.264 0.01 0.99
Child behavioral problem percentile score entering t 54.431 26.150 12 100
Average behavioral problem percentile score of all kids in HH entering t 0.557 0.240 0.12 1.00
Lowest behavioral problem percentile score of all kids in HH entering t 0.502 0.250 0.12 1.00
Education history
Enrolled in t-1 0.107 0.309 0 1
Highest grade completed entering t 13.205 2.398 0 20
Employment history
Full-year full-time employed in t-1 0.567 0.495 0 1
Full-year part-time employed in t-1 0.081 0.272 0 1
Part-year full-time employed in t-1 0.109 0.312 0 1
Part-year part-time employed in t-1 0.040 0.196 0 1
Unemployed in t-1 0.017 0.130 0 1
Out of labor force in t-1 0.186 0.389 0 1
Years employed entering t 13.622 8.083 0 33
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for Exogenous Individual Explanatory
Variables
Variable name Mean Std dev Min Max
Time-invariant individual variables in year 1986
Black race 0.305 0.460 0 1
Hispanic 0.185 0.388 0 1
AFQT score 41.003 28.260 0 100
AFQT score missing 0.031 0.174 0 1
Country of birth: non-U.S. 0.066 0.247 0 1
Residence at age 14: non-U.S. 0.022 0.146 0 1
Residence at age 14 missing 0.002 0.045 0 1
Birthplace of mother: non-U.S. 0.103 0.304 0 1
Birthplace of mother missing 0.003 0.050 0 1
Birthplace of father: non-U.S. 0.097 0.296 0 1
Birthplace of father missing 0.024 0.153 0 1
Highest grade completed of mother 10.798 3.191 0 20
Mother’s education missing 0.053 0.223 0 1
Highest grade completed of father 10.926 3.912 0 20
Father’s education missing 0.147 0.354 0 1
Time-variant individual variables over all person-years
Age in years 36.869 8.076 21 56
Child age 6.223 4.063 1 17
Female child 0.487 0.500 0 1
Rural residence 0.230 0.421 0 1
Residence type missing 0.024 0.153 0 1
Northeast region 0.158 0.365 0 1
North central region 0.235 0.424 0 1
South region 0.419 0.493 0 1
West region 0.188 0.391 0 1
Region missing 0.006 0.078 0 1
State of residence missing 0.010 0.099 0 1
Note: Dollar amounts are in year 2000 dollars.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics for Exogenous Price and Supply-Side Variables
Level of Mean Std Dev Min Max
Variation
Relationship and family size variables
Total population in 000,000s state 4.340 5.414 0.241 38.000
Sex ratio for white: male aged 20-60 / female aged 20-60 state 1.019 0.048 0.954 1.345
Sex ratio for black: male aged 20-60 / female aged 20-60 state 1.076 0.277 0.807 2.330
AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s state 4.280 1.760 1.241 11.628
State expenditure for child support enforcement per capita state 6.140 2.487 2.114 18.592
Schooling variables
Two year public college tuition (in-state) in 000s state 1.787 0.804 0.150 5.720
Four year public college tuition (in-state) in 000s state 3.834 1.779 0.876 11.241
Four year private college tuition in 000s state 13.286 4.808 2.148 28.655
Employment variables
Unemployment rate for male state 5.939 2.195 2.000 15.800
Unemployment rate for female state 5.555 1.778 2.000 13.700
Annual average pay in 000s state 31.623 6.018 20.829 59.960
EITC credit rate for family of two children state 0.336 0.125 0.110 0.560
Parental investment variables
Number of public libraries per thousand capita state 0.112 0.088 0.028 0.649
Per capita spirits consumption in Gallons state 0.880 0.326 0.371 2.666
Child school input variables
Pupil-teacher ratio county 15.795 3.087 8.000 30.000
State expenditure per pupil in 000s state 7.332 2.130 3.492 17.432
Teacher salary in 000s state 41.154 6.507 29.390 62.491
Note: Data presented are means over 50 states and the District of Columbia for the years 1986-2012. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars.
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4.1 Description of Key Variables
A goal of this dissertation is to understand the effects of family structure on child achievements.
Figure 4.1 depicts the probabilities of each family structure (single, cohabiting, married) over the
life cycle for the cohort of women in my sample. The probability of women being married increases
sharply in their twenties’ from 28% to 55%, while the their probability of being single plummets
from 63% to 36%. Both probabilities become more stable starting from age 30. The probability of
cohabitation, on the other hand, decreases slowly and steadily throughout their life cycle, with an
average of 6.7%.
Family structure is closely related to other maternal behaviors that may also influence children’s
cognitive and non-cognitive development. Maternal human capital, including education and work
experience, could affect children’s development through channels such as parenting practices or
the role model effect. As Panels A and B in Figure 4.2 show, the distribution of the schooling
and employment status differ by family structure types, with single women most likely to enroll in
school and work full-year and full-time. Another factor that could impact the resource availability
for the child is the family size. Panel C in Figure 4.2 shows that women who are married are
more likely to have a child in their 20’s and 30’s, compared with cohabiting or single women.
The probability is reversed after women reach their 40’s. Lastly, parental investment is associated
with family structure. Panel D of Figure 4.2 shows that married mothers invest the most in their
children and single mothers invest the least (in terms of average investment). To the extent that
all these behaviors interact with family structure types, and could potentially impact children’s
achievements, it is important to account for the endogeneity of such behaviors over the life cycle
in order to identify the unbiased causal impacts of family structure.
For the measure of parental investment, the NLSY79-CS assesses the home environment of
children using the Home Observation Measurement of the Environment-Short Form (HOME-SF).
HOME-SF includes four sets of questions that depend on the age of the child: ages 0–2, 3–5, 6–9
and 10 and above. One part of the HOME-SF is self-administered by the mother of the child,
with questions such as how often do you read to child (to mothers of children age under 3), and
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Figure 4.1: Family Structure Probabilities at Age t
Figure 4.2: Comparisons of Behavior Probabilities by Family Structure
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how many times, if any, have you had to spank child in the past week (to mothers of children
aged 3-5). The other part is the interviewer’s observation, with questions such as whether mother
encouraged child to contribute to the conversation (observed by the interviewer).1 These questions
are designed to measure the cognitive stimulation and emotional support from the mother, and I
use the age-specific HOME-SF percentile scores as the measure of investment in children.
To measure child cognitive achievement, I use the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT)
math score provided in the NLSY79-CS. PIAT is among the most widely used brief assessment of
academic achievement for children aged five or over. The majority of children in the NLSY79-CS
have more than three valid PIAT scores, making it possible to estimate women’s time-varying in-
vestment in children and the evolution of their children’s cognitive achievements. The PIAT math
test measures a child’s attainment in mathematics. It consists of 84 multiple-choice items of in-
creasing difficulty, ranging from early skills as recognizing numerals and progresses to measuring
advanced concepts in geometry and trigonometry. The PIAT math percentile scores I use are de-
rived on an age-specific basis from children’s PIAT math raw scores. Panel A of Figure 4.3 shows
that both boys and girls from married households have significantly higher math scores, compared
to their peers in single or cohabiting households.
To measure child non-cognitive achievement, I use the Behavior Problem Index (BPI), created
by Peterson and Zill (1986) and collected by the NLSY79-CS to measure the frequency, range, and
type of childhood behavior problems for children age four and over. The BPI used in the NLSY79-
CS includes 28 questions administered to mothers of each child, asking about specific behaviors
in the following domains: (1) antisocial behavior, (2) anxiousness/depression, (3) headstrongness,
(4) hyperactivity, (5) immature dependency, and (6) peer conflict/social withdrawal. The BPI per-
centile scores I use are derived on age-specific BPI raw scores, the higher of which indicate more
severe behavior problems. Panel B of Figure 4.3 shows that behavior problems are significantly
less severe for children from married households.
1The HOME-SF questionnaires are listed in Appendix Tables A.1-A.4.
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Figure 4.3: Children’s Achievements by Family Structure
4.2 Exogenous Prices and Supply-side Variables
I obtain the state/county-level aggregate variables that capture exogenous price and policy vari-
ations from the following data sources: (1) the school quality data, measured by pupil-teacher ratio,
teacher salary and expenditure per child, comes from the Common Core Data (CCD); (2) the col-
lege tuition data, serving as price variation for school enrollment, comes from the National Center
for Education Statistics; (3) the local employment statistics and average wages come from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics; (4) the data on EITC policies comes from the Tax Policy Center; (5) the
data on welfare policies from 1986 to 1995 comes from Fang and Keane (2004) and Bernal and
Keane (2011), and the data from 1996 to 2012 comes from the Welfare Rules Database collected by
the Urban Institute; (6) the data on the number of public libraries comes from Institute of Library
and Museum Service, and (7) the data on alcohol consumption comes from National Institutes of
Health.
28
CHAPTER 5
ESTIMATION RESULTS
5.1 Replication of Previous Literature
Before estimating the preferred model specified in the previous chapter, I estimate the reduced-
form models commonly used in the literature using my research sample of women and their chil-
dren. The purpose of this section is two-fold: 1) it demonstrates that I find similar results regarding
the effects of family structure on children’s outcomes when using the common approaches, and 2)
it reinforces the differences in estimated marginal impacts when one accounts for selection and
endogeneity bias manifested in unobservable permanent characteristics of the household or the
child.
Table 5.1 presents the coefficients for alternative specifications of children’s cognitive and non-
cognitive production functions, including OLS, household fixed effects, and child fixed effects, us-
ing my research sample. For children’s cognitive production function, the OLS regression shows
that comparing with living in a married household, living in a cohabiting household statistically
significantly decreases children’s PIAT math scores by 5.02 percentage points, while living with a
single mother decreases children’s math scores by 3.50 percentage points. When using the house-
hold fixed effects model, which eliminates the unobserved heterogeity shared across siblings within
the same household, the magnitude of the effect of cohabitation reduces to 2.36 percentage points,
and the effect of living in single households becomes statistically insignificant. When using the
child fixed effects model, which eliminates the child-specific permanent unobserved heterogeneity,
the effects of both cohabitation and singleness become statistically insignificant.
For the production function of children’s non-cognitive achievement, Table 5.1 shows simi-
lar patterns across specifications. While OLS estimates show that living in a cohabiting or single
household increases children’s behavioral problems by 6.76 and 6.66 percentage points, respec-
tively, the magnitudes of these effects are smaller after accounting for household-level unobserved
heterogeneity, and become statistically insignificant after eliminating child-specific permanent un-
observables. The changes of coefficients in these alternative specifications emphasize the existence
of the household-level and child-specific unobserved heterogeneity, which could potentially bias
the estimates if not properly accounted for. In the dynamic multiple equation model below, I
explicitly model both levels of unobserved heterogeneity and estimate their distributions.
These results are consistent with findings from the literature examining the effects of family
structure on children’s outcomes. Using household or child fixed effects to account for unobserved
heterogeneity, the literature generally finds that the negative impacts of unmarried parenthood on
children’s outcomes become smaller or statistically insignificant, compared to results from OLS
regressions. For example, using data from both the NLSY79 and the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), Bjo¨rklund et al. (2007) show that the negative impacts of non-intact family
types (including single mother, single father, stepmother, stepfather families) on children’s edu-
cational attainment become statistically insignificant with household fixed effects. Aughinbaugh
et al. (2005) also find that the negative effects of divorce on children’s PIAT Math score and Be-
havioral Problem Index score disappear after using child fixed effects.1
1Aughinbaugh et al. (2005) use the raw scores of PIAT Math and Behavioral Problem Index for children in the
NLSY79-CS data, while this dissertation uses the percentile scores. Therefore, the magnitudes of the effects are not
directly comparable.
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Table 5.1: Alternative Specifications of Achievement Production Functions
Math Percentile Score Behavior Problems Score
OLS Household Child OLS Household Child
fixed effects fixed effects fixed effects fixed effects
Cohabiting -5.017*** -2.358** -1.256 6.758*** 2.663** 1.579
(1.206) (1.061) (0.908) (1.399) (1.147) (1.109)
Single -3.504*** -1.230 -0.219 6.656*** 1.917** 1.173
(0.702) (0.856) (0.715) (0.830) (0.826) (0.809)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory vari-
ables include an indicator for non-biological father, the age, race and gender of the child, women’s
age, education level, and region of residence, time trend, and indicators for missing values.
5.2 Results from the Dynamic Dynamic Multiple-equation Model
This section discusses the key findings using the estimated dynamic multiple-equation model.
I first test how the estimated model fits the observed data. Then, I use the estimated coefficients
to discuss factors that influence women’s family structure and patterns displayed in children’s
achievement production functions. Lastly, I calculate the contemporaneous and life-cycle marginal
effects of family structure on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements.
5.2.1 Model Fit
It is important that the estimated model captures the patterns displayed in the observed data.
I use the estimated parameters to simulate women’s life-cycle behaviors and their children’s out-
comes from the first period forward, and use the simulated values of endogenous explanatory
variables to update behaviors and outcomes in the next period. The comparison of the summary
statistics for the simulated behaviors and outcomes with the observed data in Table 5.2 suggests
that the estimated model fits the data well.
5.2.2 Estimated Coefficients
Results from estimation of the correlated set of equations are detailed in Appendix Tables A.5-
A.19. The coefficients on endogenous explanatory variables are listed first followed by those for
exogenous variables and unobserved heterogeneity. Here I focus my discussion on the key behav-
ior of interest in this dissertation, namely women’s relationship status. The estimated coefficients
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics for Model Fit
Outcomes Observed Simulated
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Relationship Status
Married 0.556 0.497 0.551 0.497
Cohabiting 0.067 0.249 0.069 0.254
Single 0.377 0.485 0.379 0.485
School Enrollment 0.100 0.300 0.110 0.313
Employment Status
Full-year full-time employed 0.575 0.494 0.561 0.496
Full-year part-time employed 0.081 0.272 0.084 0.278
Part-year full-time employed 0.106 0.307 0.104 0.305
Part-year part-time employed 0.038 0.191 0.039 0.195
Unemployed 0.017 0.129 0.018 0.132
Out of labor force 0.185 0.388 0.193 0.395
Family Size Changes
Have a chid 0.063 0.244 0.061 0.240
Lose a child 0.052 0.223 0.038 0.191
No change 0.884 0.320 0.901 0.299
Parental investment
HOME percentile score 0.476 0.291 0.475 0.260
Child Achievements
PIAT Math percentile score 0.523 0.278 0.515 0.285
BPI behaviral problem percentile score 0.547 0.273 0.540 0.285
Wage and Income
Hourly wage 13.73 10.80 13.62 8.30
Spouse/Partner income 44518.86 41398.52 44680.61 43114.62
Note: Hourly wage and spouse/partner income are in year 2000 dollars.
and their standard errors are shown in Appendix Table A.5 and A.6, in which the reference re-
lationship status is married, and the alternative statuses are cohabiting and single, respectively.
The coefficients on relationship history display three features. First, there exist self-sustaining ef-
fects within each relationship status. That is, being in a relationship status last period increases
the probability of choosing the same relationship status in the current period. In addition, as the
duration of a particular relationship status increases, it is more likely that the woman stays in the
same relationship. Second, singleness and cohabitation reinforce each other. That is, being single
last period increases a woman’s probability of choosing cohabitation over marriage in the current
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period. Similarly, cohabiting last period increases the chance of being single over married this
period. The third finding is that the same past life-cycle behavior may have varying roles when it
comes to choosing alternative relationship status (cohabiting/single) versus marriage. For example,
after having a child in the last period, a woman is less likely to choose singleness over marriage,
but she is no less likely to choose cohabitation over marriage. Another example is that unemploy-
ment increases the woman’s probability of being single over married, but it does not impact the
probability between cohabitation and marriage. One endogenous factor that has consistent impacts
on relationship choice is the woman’s education level. More educated women are more likely to
choose marriage both over cohabitation and over singleness.
The estimated coefficients of the correlated set of equations also provide empirical support
for the existence of complementarity of parental investments, and the self-productivity of skills.
Appendix Table A.15 shows that parents invest more in children who have lower behavioral prob-
lems, which is consistent with the theory of static complementarity of parental investment (Cunha
et al., 2006). In addition, Appendix Tables A.18 and A.19 display that non-cognitive achievement
promotes the formation of cognitive achievement, but cognitive achievement in general do not pro-
mote the formation of non-cognitive achievement. The same patterns of the self-productivity of
skills are found in Cunha and Heckman (2008).
5.2.3 Estimates of the Contemporaneous and Life-cycle Marginal Effects
In order to understand the dynamic impacts of family structure on children’s achievements,
I first calculate the effects of a one-period change in family structure from cohabiting or single
household to married household on children’s contemporaneous achievements. That is, holding
everything else the same, if the child is living in a married rather than a cohabiting or single house-
hold this year, how might her cognitive and non-cognitive development differ in the same year? I
call this the contemporaneous (or one-period) effect. Table 5.3 shows that the contemporaneous
effects are statistically insignificant, indicating that children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achieve-
ments are not immediately affected by changes in family structure.
A lack of contemporaneous effects does not necessarily imply that family structure does not
influence children’s development in the long run. I now calculate the life-cycle marginal effects
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Table 5.3: Contemporaneous Marginal Effects of Family Structure on Child Achievements
Family Structure Alternatives Marginal Effects
Married Cohabiting Single Cohabiting→Married Single→Married
Math percentile score 50.48 49.99 50.65 0.50 -0.17
(5.55) (5.87) (5.68) (1.97) (0.99)
Behavioral problem 48.63 48.75 48.70 -0.12 -0.07
percentile score (4.00) (4.10) (4.02) (1.06) (0.49)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
between a cohabiting/single household and a married household. That is, I simulate schooling,
employment, family size and parental investment behaviors of each woman if they were married,
cohabiting or single throughout their lives and compare the simulated cognitive and non-cognitive
achievements for the children. It is worth noting that the life-cycle effects include both the accumu-
lated change in children’s contemporaneous outcomes, and the changes of outcomes due to changes
in all life-cycle behaviors associated with the change of family structure. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 dis-
play the life-cycle marginal effects on children’s cognitive achievements (math percentile scores)
through age 5 to 14 for boys and girls, respectively. The statistically insignificant estimates indi-
cate that family structure does not have life-cycle impacts on children’s cognitive achievements.
In contrast, Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that family structure does influence children’s non-cognitive
achievements, especially during their early ages. Specifically, the last column of Table 5.6 shows
that, compared to being born and raised in single households throughout the childhood period,
boys’ behavior problems decrease by around 7 percentage points, or 0.27 standard deviation, when
born and raised in married households. The beneficial effects are statistically significant for boys
from age 4 to age 10. For girls, growing up in continuously married households have beneficial
effects when compared to single households and cohabiting households. Specifically, column 5 of
Table 5.7 shows suggestive evidence that, compared to growing up in cohabiting households, girls’
behavior problems decrease by around 11 percentage points, or 0.4 standard deviations, during age
4 to age 6 if raised in continuously married households. Column 6 of Table 5.7 shows that when
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compared with being raised in single households, growing up in continuously married households
also decreases girls’ behavior problems by around 5 percentage points, or 0.18 standard deviations,
during ages 4 to 8.
Table 5.4: Life-cycle Marginal Effects of Family Structure on Boys’ PIAT Math Percentile
Score by Age
Family Structure Alternatives Marginal Effects
Boy Age Married Cohabiting Single Cohabiting→Married Single→Married
5 50.00 51.34 47.71 -1.34 2.29
(11.50) (12.82) (11.60) (6.44) (3.23)
6 51.86 53.47 51.26 -1.61 0.60
(12.13) (13.07) (12.31) (6.05) (2.97)
7 53.54 54.72 53.68 -1.18 -0.15
(15.05) (15.86) (15.32) (6.12) (3.06)
8 55.17 55.57 55.27 -0.39 -0.10
(18.42) (19.30) (18.79) (6.52) (3.40)
9 56.50 55.72 56.29 0.78 0.21
(21.48) (22.48) (21.91) (7.16) (3.86)
10 57.48 55.41 56.73 2.07 0.76
(24.07) (25.22) (24.58) (7.99) (4.40)
11 57.95 54.66 56.40 3.29 1.55
(26.31) (27.55) (26.87) (9.00) (5.00)
12 57.61 53.06 55.46 4.55 2.15
(28.18) (29.43) (28.81) (10.10) (5.66)
13 56.66 50.99 54.39 5.66 2.27
(29.75) (30.96) (30.47) (11.28) (6.35)
14 55.06 48.63 53.43 6.44 1.63
(31.16) (32.25) (31.99) (12.59) (7.10)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.5: Life-cycle Marginal Effects of Family Structure on Girls’ PIAT Math Percentile
Score by Age
Family Structure Alternatives Marginal Effects
Girl Age Married Cohabiting Single Cohabiting→Married Single→Married
5 52.55 56.50 51.23 -3.95 1.33
(11.54) (13.16) (11.64) (7.45) (3.66)
6 53.31 57.16 53.77 -3.85 -0.46
(12.15) (13.41) (12.29) (7.04) (3.31)
7 54.09 57.24 55.42 -3.16 -1.33
(15.04) (16.13) (15.23) (7.06) (3.29)
8 54.84 56.99 56.45 -2.15 -1.61
(18.44) (19.50) (18.67) (7.37) (3.54)
9 55.30 56.04 56.34 -0.74 -1.05
(21.51) (22.63) (21.80) (7.89) (3.95)
10 55.33 54.78 55.74 0.55 -0.41
(24.18) (25.34) (24.50) (8.61) (4.45)
11 55.22 53.25 55.03 1.97 0.18
(26.40) (27.57) (26.77) (9.49) (5.04)
12 54.34 51.06 53.85 3.28 0.49
(28.29) (29.42) (28.73) (10.53) (5.68)
13 52.86 48.35 52.36 4.51 0.50
(29.84) (30.88) (30.36) (11.66) (6.36)
14 50.43 45.07 50.72 5.36 -0.29
(31.16) (32.03) (31.80) (12.88) (7.09)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.6: Life-cycle Marginal Effects of Family Structure on Boys’ Behavioral Problem
Percentile Score by Age
Family Structure Alternatives Marginal Effects
Boy Age Married Cohabiting Single Cohabiting→Married Single→Married
4 54.14 60.75 60.29 -6.61 -6.15**
(24.08) (23.85) (23.69) (5.90) (2.50)
5 51.89 58.66 59.20 -6.77 -7.31***
(22.17) (21.98) (21.86) (5.62) (2.53)
6 51.71 58.18 59.45 -6.47 -7.75***
(21.33) (21.22) (21.08) (5.64) (2.68)
7 51.86 57.68 59.47 -5.82 -7.61***
(21.19) (21.15) (20.97) (5.84) (2.86)
8 52.34 57.44 59.64 -5.10 -7.30**
(21.57) (21.56) (21.35) (6.18) (3.08)
9 52.87 57.14 59.69 -4.28 -6.83**
(22.31) (22.29) (22.07) (6.59) (3.31)
10 53.36 56.84 59.65 -3.48 -6.29*
(23.22) (23.18) (22.95) (7.03) (3.55)
11 53.89 56.76 59.61 -2.88 -5.73
(24.18) (24.11) (23.86) (7.47) (3.78)
12 54.09 56.33 59.38 -2.23 -5.28
(25.10) (25.04) (24.77) (7.90) (4.03)
13 54.14 55.99 59.37 -1.85 -5.23
(25.96) (25.92) (25.62) (8.28) (4.30)
14 53.66 55.40 59.22 -1.74 -5.56
(26.73) (26.73) (26.40) (8.65) (4.61)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.7: Life-cycle Marginal Effects of Family Structure on Girls’ Behavioral Problem
Percentile Score by Age
Family Structure Alternatives Marginal Effects
Girl Age Married Cohabiting Single Cohabiting→Married Single→Married
4 50.85 62.10 55.61 -11.25* -4.76**
(24.03) (23.74) (23.84) (6.42) (2.37)
5 48.82 60.00 54.45 -11.18* -5.63**
(22.10) (21.90) (22.05) (6.15) (2.35)
6 48.97 59.72 54.63 -10.75* -5.65**
(21.24) (21.12) (21.23) (6.16) (2.50)
7 49.41 59.54 54.94 -10.13 -5.54**
(21.12) (21.06) (21.13) (6.39) (2.70)
8 49.98 59.37 55.18 -9.39 -5.20*
(21.53) (21.48) (21.52) (6.72) (2.93)
9 50.53 59.03 55.02 -8.50 -4.49
(22.30) (22.23) (22.25) (7.14) (3.17)
10 51.20 58.82 54.95 -7.61 -3.75
(23.23) (23.13) (23.14) (7.59) (3.42)
11 51.77 58.75 55.00 -6.98 -3.23
(24.19) (24.07) (24.05) (8.03) (3.67)
12 51.93 58.44 55.01 -6.51 -3.08
(25.12) (25.00) (24.94) (8.44) (3.93)
13 52.06 58.17 55.05 -6.11 -2.99
(25.96) (25.85) (25.74) (8.85) (4.19)
14 51.63 57.75 54.78 -6.11 -3.15
(26.71) (26.66) (26.50) (9.19) (4.46)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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CHAPTER 6
POLICY EXPERIMENTS
Having established the contemporaneous and life-cycle impacts of family structure on chil-
dren’s achievements, I now evaluate how policy interventions with different focuses, when capable
of changing target population’s behaviors, could have different impacts on children’s cognitive
and non-cognitive achievements. Specifically, the first experiment aims to promote marriage, the
second to improve maternal education level, and the third to emphasize parenting skills training.
6.1 Experiment A - Marriage Promotion
In the past few decades, policy makers in the U.S. have been implementing intervention pro-
grams that aim to promote healthy relationship and marriage. The “Building Strong Families
Project” is among the most rigorously implemented and evaluated programs across the country.
It is designed as a random control trial and offers relationship skills education and other support
services to a specific target population - unmarried couples who are expecting or who have just
had a baby. However, the evaluation of this project shows that after three years, the likelihood for
couples to stay together or get married was not affected by the intervention (see Wood, Moore,
Clarkwest, and Killewald, 2014). In this counterfactual experiment, I evaluate how children’s cog-
nitive and non-cognitive achievements would have changed if such program were redesigned and
became more successfully in promoting marriage to the target population.
I implement this experiment by simulating individuals’ behaviors in each period to identify
women who are unmarried and are having a new child in the same period, for which I name the
target population and the critical period, respectively. I then randomly select 50 percent of this
target population, and experimentally make them be married in the critical period. I continue to
simulate their life-cycle behaviors afterwards, and compare their children’s outcomes with and
without such intervention. Panel A of Table 6.1 shows that when looking at the target population
together, such intervention does not have statistically significant effects on children’s achieve-
ments. However, when separating the target population by what their relationship status in the
critical period would have been without the intervention, Panel B of Table 6.1 shows suggestive
evidence that for women who would otherwise be single in the critical period, their children’s be-
havior problems decrease by 1.4 percentage points with the intervention, which amounts to a 0.05
standard deviation decrease compared with the baseline achievements. Table 6.2 provides an upper
bound for the impacts of such marriage intervention programs on children’s achievements. In this
table, I experimentally make the entire target population to get married in the critical period, and
simulation their life-cycle behaviors afterwards. Similar patterns hold in this extreme case: for
women who would otherwise be single in the critical period, their children’s behavior problems
now decrease by 1.99 percentage points with the intervention, which amounts to a 0.07 standard
deviation decrease.
Table 6.1: Experiment A1 - Effects of Marriage Promotion on Child Achievements with 50%
Success Rate
With Intervention No intervention Difference
Panel A. Overall target population
Math percentile score 50.75 51.01 -0.25
(19.34) (19.37) (1.12)
Behavioral problem percentile score 55.44 56.72 -1.28
(20.71) (20.62) (0.94)
Panel B. Initially single-mother households
Math percentile score 50.80 51.09 -0.29
(19.39) (19.44) (0.88)
Behavioral problem percentile score 55.39 56.81 -1.42*
(20.77) (20.72) (0.76)
Panel C. Initially cohabiting households
Math percentile score 50.53 50.64 -0.11
(19.31) (19.32) (1.51)
Behavioral problem percentile score 55.62 56.34 -0.73
(20.54) (20.27) (1.43)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.2: Experiment A2 - Effects of Marriage Promotion on Child Achievements with 100%
Success Rate
With Intervention No intervention Difference
Panel A. Overall target population
Math percentile score 50.72 51.00 -0.28
(19.35) (19.37) (1.75)
Behavioral problem percentile score 54.78 56.72 -1.94
(20.78) (20.62) (1.42)
Panel B. Initially single-mother households
Math percentile score 50.75 51.09 -0.34
(19.37) (19.32) (1.37)
Behavioral problem percentile score 54.82 56.80 -1.99*
(20.80) (20.27) (1.13)
Panel C. Initially cohabiting households
Math percentile score 50.60 50.64 -0.04
(19.32) (19.32) (2.33)
Behavioral problem percentile score 50.60 56.34 -1.76
(20.65) (20.27) (2.05)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6.2 Experiment B - Maternal Education Promotion
The changes of family structure in the U.S. since the 1960s are not shared across women’s
education levels. McLanahan (2012) shows that the vast majority of women with college degrees
have been choosing to give birth within the context of marriage, with the probability of moth-
ers being single remaining less than 10 percent throughout the period from 1960 to 2010. On
the other hand, women with lower education have experienced dramatic increases in non-marital
births. For high school graduates and college dropouts, the probability of mothers being single
has increased from less than 10 percent in 1960 to around 40 percent in 2010, and the probability
for women with less than high school degrees has increased from around 10 percent to almost
50 percent. This education gap leads to another policy question: how would children’s cognitive
and non-cognitive achievements change if the intervention for single and cohabiting mothers focus
on facilitating women to pursue higher education? In fact, numerous government and non-profit
programs have been providing assistance for single mothers to continue their education, through
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scholarships, grants or work-study arrangements. In this experiment, I explore how such programs
could potentially impact the children’s achievements.
To implement this experiment, I simulate individuals’ behaviors in each period to identify
women who are unmarried and have lower than college education. I then randomly select 50
percent of this target population, and experimentally make them enroll in school. I allow their life-
cycle behaviors to evolve afterwards and compare their children’s achievements with and without
the intervention. Table 6.3 shows that with their mothers enrolling in school and obtaining higher
levels of education, children’s behavior problems decrease by 0.64 percentage points - a 0.02 stan-
dard deviation decrease, and the effects are statistically significant for both single and cohabiting
households. At the same time, children’s math scores improve by 0.84 percentage points - a 0.03
standard deviation increase. In the extreme case when such intervention is able to enroll all of the
target population in school, as is shown in Table 6.4, the beneficial effects are augmented, with
children’s behavior problems decreasing by 1.02 percentage points, and math score increasing by
1.4 percentage points.
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Table 6.3: Experiment B1 - Effects of Education Promotion on Child Achievements with 50%
Success Rate
With Intervention No intervention Difference
Panel A. Overall target population
Math percentile score 49.26 48.42 0.84*
(19.33) (19.31) (0.50)
Behavioral problem percentile score 57.38 58.02 -0.64*
(20.44) (20.39) (0.36)
Panel B. Initially single-mother households
Math percentile score 49.57 48.73 0.84*
(19.53) (19.51) (0.49)
Behavioral problem percentile score 57.27 57.86 -0.59*
(20.62) (20.56) (0.35)
Panel C. Initially cohabiting households
Math percentile score 47.32 46.49 0.84
(18.61) (18.63) (0.06)
Behavioral problem percentile score 58.07 59.01 -0.95**
(19.46) (19.46) (0.41)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.4: Experiment B2 - Effects of Education Promotion on Child Achievements with 100%
Success Rate
With Intervention No intervention Difference
Panel A. Overall target population
Math percentile score 49.81 48.42 1.40**
(19.35) (19.31) (0.66)
Behavioral problem percentile score 57.00 58.02 -1.02**
(20.47) (20.39) (0.48)
Panel B. Initially single-mother households
Math percentile score 49.88 48.73 1.43**
(19.57) (19.51) (0.65)
Behavioral problem percentile score 56.91 57.86 -0.96**
-20.65 (20.56) (0.47)
Panel C. Initially cohabiting households
Math percentile score 48.68 18.63 1.18
(18.63) (18.63) (0.82)
Behavioral problem percentile score 57.28 19.46 -1.38**
(19.48) (19.46) (0.55)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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6.3 Experiment C - Parental Investment Increase
As shown in Panel D of Figure 4.2, the amount of parental investment in children is closely re-
lated to family structure choices. Governments and foundations in the U.S. have supported various
parenting education programs, aimed at improving parenting knowledge, attitudes and practices.
In this counterfactual experiment, I evaluate how children’s achievements would change if such
programs are effective in encouraging parents to invest more in their children and to improve their
parenting skills. Specifically, I use the model to experimentally increase parental investment (mea-
sured by HOME-SF score) by up to 10 percentage points or up to 30 percentage points throughout
the children’s life, and compare children’s outcomes with and without the intervention in each
scenario. Comparing the HOME-SF raw scores and percentage scores, a 10 percentage points in-
crease is equivalent to changing parenting practice in one to two items in the questions listed in
Appendix Table A.1-A.4, and a 30 percentage points increase amounts to changing three to four
items. Note that all the other life-cycle behaviors, including relationship status, evolve freely with
this experiment.
Table 6.5 shows that a 10 percentage point increase in parental investment can decrease chil-
dren’s behavior problems by 1.38 percentage points, which amounts to a 0.05 standard deviation
decrease. It can also increase children’s math scores by 0.92 percentage points - a 0.03 stan-
dard deviation increase. Such beneficial effects are statistically significant for both boys and girls.
When increasing parental investment by 30 percentage points, as is shown in Table 6.6, not only
do children’s behavior problems further decrease, now by 3.89 percentage points, a 0.14 standard
deviation decrease, their average math score also increases by 2.59 percentage points, or 0.09 stan-
dard deviation. Again, these beneficial effects are statistically significant for both boys and girls.
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Table 6.5: Experiment C1 - Effects of Parental Investment Increase (by 10 percentage
points) on Child Achievements
With intervention No intervention Difference
Panel A. All children
Math percentile score 52.44 51.52 0.92**
(18.86) (18.85) (0.40)
Behavioral Problem percentile score 54.55 55.93 -1.38***
(20.60) (20.56) (0.41)
Panel B. Boys
Math percentile score 52.64 51.73 0.91**
(18.85) (18.84) (0.40)
Behavioral Problem percentile score 56.24 57.64 -1.40***
(20.56) (20.50) (0.41)
Panel C. Girls
Math percentile score 52.23 51.31 0.92**
(18.84) (18.87) (0.41)
Behavioral Problem percentile score 52.86 54.23 -1.37**
(20.66) (20.63) (0.40)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6.6: Experiment C2 - Effects of Parental Investment Increase (by 30 percentage
points) on Child Achievements
With intervention No intervention Difference
Panel A. All children
Math percentile score 54.11 51.52 2.59**
(18.86) (18.88) (1.13)
Behavioral Problem percentile score 52.04 55.93 -3.89***
(20.60) (20.65) (1.16)
Panel B. Boys
Math percentile score 54.30 51.73 2.57**
(18.85) (18.85) (1.14)
Behavioral Problem percentile score 53.71 57.64 -3.93***
(20.56) (20.63) (1.18)
Panel C. Girls
Math percentile score 53.91 51.31 2.60**
(18.84) (18.91) (1.13)
Behavioral Problem percentile score 50.38 54.23 -3.85***
(20.66) (20.67) (1.15)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped parametrically with 200 draws.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This dissertation uses a dynamic multiple-equation approach to examine the effects of family
structure on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements. Using data on women and their
children in NLSY79 from 1986 to 2012, I jointly model women’s dynamic behaviors on relation-
ship, school enrollment, employment, family size and investment in children, and how these be-
haviors jointly influence their children’s cognitive and non-cognitive achievements. In this model,
women’s behaviors can be influenced by their behavior histories, their children’s previous achieve-
ments, the demographic characteristics of household members, the state and local environment,
the unobserved heterogeneity, and random shocks.
Simulations based on the estimated model demonstrate the following major conclusions. First,
I find little evidence that family structure has immediate (short-run) effects on children’s achieve-
ments. Second, in the long run, compared to single households, a continuous marriage reduces
behavioral problems for boys aged 4 to 10 by about 7 percentage points, and for girls aged 4 to 8
by about 5 percentage points. In addition, young girls age 4 to 6 also benefit from growing up in
continuously married households instead of cohabiting households through a reduction of behavior
problems by around 11 percentage points. Third, effective policy interventions that target unmar-
ried couples who are expecting or who have recently had a baby, could potentially have small
but significant impacts on the behavioral problems of children from original single households.
Fourth, programs that are able to encourage less than college educated unmarried mothers to con-
tinue their education have small beneficial effects on both children’s cognitive and non-cognitive
achievements. Fifth, programs that enhance parenting skills can potentially reduce both boys’ and
girls’ behavior problems, and improve their cognitive achievements.
APPENDIX A
NLSY79-CHILD HOME-SF SCALES AND JOINT ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table A.1: NLSY79-Child HOME-SF Scales for Children under age 3
Scale* Question Text
C How often does child have a chance to get out of the house?
C About how many children’s books does child have?
C How often do you get a chance to read to child?
C How often do you take child to the grocery store?
C About how many, if any, cuddly, soft, or role-playing toys does child have?
C About how many, if any, push or pull toys does child have?
C Some parents spend time teaching their children new skill while other parents believe
children learn best on their own. Which most closely describes your attitude?
E How often does child eat a meal with both you and his/her father/step/father-figure?
E How often do you talk to child while you are working?
E About how many times, if any, have you had to spank child in the past week?
E Interviewer: Mother spontaneously spoke to child twice or more (excluding scolding)?
E Interviewer: Mother responded verbally to child’s speech?
E Interviewer: Mother caressed, kissed, or hugged child at least once?
E Interviewer: Mother slapped or spanked child at least once?
E Interviewer: Mother interfered w/ child’s actions or restricted child from exploring ≥ 3 times?
C Interviewer: Mother provided toys or interesting activities for child?
E Interviewer: Mother kept child in view/ could see child/ looked at him/her often?
C Interviewer: Child’s play environment is safe?
* C=Cognitive stimulation; E=Emotional support.
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Table A.2: NLSY79-Child HOME-SF Scales for Children age 3-5 years
Scale* Question Text
C How often do you read stories to child?
C About how many children’s books does child have?
C About how many magazines does your family get regularly?
C Does child have the use of a CD player, tape deck, or tape recorder, or record player at home
and at least 5 children’s records or tapes?
C Do you or have you helped [child] with numbers?
C Do you (or someone else) help [child] with the alphabet?
C Do you (or someone else) help [child] with colors?
C Do you (or someone else) help [child] with shapes and sizes?
E How much choice is child allowed in deciding foods s/he eats at breakfast & lunch?
E About how many hours is the TV on in your home each day?
E If child got so angry that s/he hit you, what would you do?
C How often does a family member get a chance to take child on any kind of outing?
C How often has a family member taken or arranged to take child to any type of museum?
E How often does child eat a meal with you and his/her father/stepfather/father-figure?
E About how many times, if any, have you had to spank child in the past week?
E Interviewer: Mother conversed w/ child ≥ 2 times (no scolding or suspicious comments)?
E Interviewer: Mother answered child’s questions or requests verbally?
E Interviewer: Mother caressed, kissed, or hugged child at least once?
E Interviewer: Mother introduced interviewer to child by name?
E Interviewer: Mother physically restricted or (shook/grabbed) child?
E Interviewer: Mother slapped or spanked child at least once?
E Interviewer: Mother’s voice conveyed positive feeling about child?
C Interviewer: Child’s play environment is safe?
C Interviewer: Interior of the home is dark or perceptually monotonous?
C Interviewer: All visible rooms of house/apartment are reasonably clean?
C Interviewer: All visible rooms of house/apartment are minimally cluttered?
* C=Cognitive stimulation; E=Emotional support.
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Table A.3: NLSY79-Child HOME-SF Scales for Children age 6-9 years
Scale* Question Text
C About how many books does child have?
C How often do you read aloud to child?
E How often is child expected to make his/her own bed?
E How often is child expected to clean his/her own room?
E How often is child expected to clean up after spills?
E How often is child expected to bathe himself/herself?
E How often is child expected to pick up after himself/herself?
C Is there a musical instrument that child can use here at home?
C Does your family get a daily newspaper?
C How often does child read for enjoyment?
C Does your family encourage child to start and keep doing hobbies?
C Does child get special lessons or belong to any organization that encourages activities
such as sports, music, art, dance, drama, etc.?
C How often has a family member taken or arranged to take child to any type of museum?
C How often has a family member taken or arranged to take child to any type of musical or
theatrical performance within the past year?
E How often does your whole family get together with relatives or friends?
E How often does child spend time with his/her father, stepfather, or father-figure?
E How often does child eat a meal with both mother and father?
C When your family watches TV, do you or (father) discuss programs with him/her?
E Mother response to tantrum
E How many times in the past week have you had to spank child?
E Interviewer: Mother encouraged child to contribute to the conversation?
E Interviewer: Mother answered child’s questions or requests verbally?
E Interviewer: Mother conversed with child excluding scolding or suspicious comments?
E Interviewer: Mother introduced interviewer to child by name?
E Interviewer: Mother’s voice conveyed positive feeling about child?
C Interviewer: Interior of the home is dark or perceptually monotonous?
C Interviewer: All visible rooms of the house/apartment are reasonably clean?
C Interviewer: All visible rooms of the house/apartment are minimally cluttered?
C Interviewer: Building has no dangerous structural or health hazards
within a school-aged child’s range.
* C=Cognitive stimulation; E=Emotional support.
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Table A.4: NLSY79-Child HOME-SF Scales for Children age 10-14 years
Scale* Question Text
C How many books does child have?
E How often is child expected to make his/her own bed?
E How often is child expected to clean his/her own room?
E How often is child expected to pick up after himself/herself?
E How often is child expected to keep shared living areas clean and straight?
E How often is child expected to do routine chores?
E How often is child expected to help manage his/her own time?
C Is there a musical instrument that child can use here at home?
C Does your family get a daily newspaper?
C How often does child read for enjoyment?
C Does your family encourage child to start and keep doing hobbies?
C Does child get special lessons or belong to any organization that encourages activities
such as sports, music, art, dance, drama, etc.?
C How often has any family member taken or arranged to take child to any type of museum?
C How often has a family member taken or arranged to take child to any type of musical or
theatrical performance within the past year?
E How often does your whole family get together with relatives or friends?
E How often does child spend time with his/her father, stepfather, or father-figure?
E How often does child spend time with his/her father, stepfather, or father-figure in outdoor activities?
E How often does child eat a meal with both mother and father?
C When your family watches TV together, do you or child’s father (or stepfather or father-figure)
discuss TV programs with him/her?
E Mother response to tantrum
E Interviewer: Mother encouraged child to contribute to the conversation?
E Interviewer: Mother answered child’s questions or requests verbally?
E Interviewer: Mother conversed with child excluding scolding or suspicious comments?
E Interviewer: Mother introduced interviewer to child by name?
E Interviewer: Mother’s voice conveyed positive feeling about child?
C Interviewer: Interior of the home is dark or perceptually monotonous?
C Interviewer: All visible rooms of the house/apartment are reasonably clean?
C Interviewer: All visible rooms of the house/apartment are minimally cluttered?
C Interviewer: Building has no potentially dangerous structural or health hazards
within a school-aged child’s range.
* C=Cognitive stimulation; E=Emotional support.
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Table A.5: Estimation Results: Relationship Status (cohabiting
relative to married)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.095 0.016 ***
Cohabited in t-1 6.387 0.165 ***
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 0.122 0.013 ***
Single in t-1 5.095 0.161 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.005 0.008
More than one marriage entering t -0.026 0.070
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.094 0.050 *
Number of children above age 5 entering t 0.060 0.031 *
Acquire any children in t-1 0.074 0.091
Lose any children in t-1 0.102 0.106
Enrolled in t-1 0.042 0.074
Highest grade completed in t-1 -0.125 0.014 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 -0.099 0.075
Unemployed in t-1 0.269 0.164
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 0.079 0.120
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 -0.049 0.070
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 -0.270 0.099 ***
Years employed entering t -0.008 0.006
Children’s average math score in t-1 -0.312 0.656
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 0.172 0.605
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.139 0.649
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 0.260 0.611
Black race 0.038 0.063
Hispanic 0.100 0.073
AFQT score in 00s -0.249 0.121 **
Age in years 0.017 0.018
Age squared -0.007 0.007
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.007 0.009
Rural residence -0.096 0.059
North central region 0.071 0.115
West region 0.335 0.185 *
South region 0.060 0.144
State total population in hundred millions -0.211 0.598
State sex ratio for white 0.610 1.060
State sex ratio for black -0.231 0.318
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s 0.006 0.029
State expenditure on child support enforcement 0.002 0.016
State unemployment rate for male -0.025 0.030
State unemployment rate for female -0.008 0.038
State average annual pay in 0000s 0.106 0.102
State EITC credit rate for family of two children -0.018 0.006 ***
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s 0.082 0.122
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s 0.454 0.283
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s 0.780 0.822
State average pupil-teacher ratio 0.004 0.011
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s 0.187 0.371
State average teacher salary in 0000s -0.092 0.103
State per-capita spirits consumption 0.385 0.143 ***
State number of public library per thousand capita 0.431 0.902
Time trend 0.054 0.036
Time trend squared -0.008 0.012
Constant -5.101 0.332 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -7.053 0.431 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.6: Estimation Results: Relationship Status (single relative
to married)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.090 0.004 ***
Cohabited in t-1 2.184 0.084 ***
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 0.013 0.017
Single in t-1 4.999 0.051 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.035 0.006 ***
More than one marriage entering t -0.257 0.047 ***
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.004 0.035
Number of children above age 5 entering t 0.007 0.023
Aquire any children in t-1 -0.121 0.065 *
Lose any children in t-1 -0.081 0.082
Enrolled in t-1 0.152 0.050 ***
Highest grade completed in t-1 -0.059 0.009 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 -0.067 0.055
Unemployed in t-1 0.268 0.124 **
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 0.057 0.083
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 0.007 0.052
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 -0.132 0.065 **
Years employed entering t -0.018 0.004 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 -0.225 0.457
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 -0.011 0.424
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.694 0.438
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.062 0.419
Black race 0.615 0.045 ***
Hispanic 0.207 0.054 ***
AFQT score in 00s -0.250 0.084 ***
Age in years 0.031 0.013 **
Age squared 0.001 0.005
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.016 0.006 **
Rural residence -0.189 0.043 ***
North central region 0.107 0.083
West region 0.170 0.132
South region 0.030 0.104
State total population in hundred millions -0.023 0.407
State sex ratio for white -1.097 1.003
State sex ratio for black -0.033 0.220
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s -0.009 0.021
State expenditure on child support enforcement 0.018 0.012
State unemployment rate for male -0.020 0.021
State unemployment rate for female 0.020 0.027
State average annual pay in 0000s 0.147 0.073 **
State EITC credit rate for family of two children -0.008 0.005 *
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s 0.038 0.086
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.241 0.202
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s 0.394 0.534
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.016 0.008 **
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.278 0.259
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.003 0.073
State per-capita spirits consumption 0.151 0.101
State number of public library per thousand capita -0.076 0.636
Time trend 0.027 0.026
Time trend squared 0.001 0.008
Constant -2.695 0.209 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -4.532 0.355 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.7: Estimation Results: School Enrollment (enrolled
relative to not enrolled)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 0.004 0.003
Cohabited in t-1 0.238 0.094 **
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 -0.038 0.019 **
Single in t-1 0.165 0.049 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.013 0.004 ***
More than one marriage entering t 0.174 0.044 ***
Number of children under age 5 entering t -0.021 0.033
Number of children above age 5 entering t 0.070 0.020 ***
Aquire any children in t-1 -0.251 0.064 ***
Lose any children in t-1 0.194 0.076 **
Enrolled in t-1 3.787 0.031 ***
Highest grade completed in t-1 0.090 0.009 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 0.067 0.051
Unemployed in t-1 0.211 0.113 *
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 0.304 0.067 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 -0.055 0.048
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 0.050 0.053
Years employed entering t 0.021 0.004 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 0.011 0.438
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 -0.259 0.406
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.402 0.430
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.136 0.419
Black race 0.208 0.042 ***
Hispanic 0.168 0.049 ***
AFQT score in 00s 0.346 0.075 ***
Age in years -0.036 0.012 ***
Age squared -0.003 0.004
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.005 0.006
Rural residence -0.055 0.039
North central region -0.042 0.076
West region 0.002 0.118
South region 0.045 0.093
State total population in hundred millions -0.555 0.347
State sex ratio for white -2.019 0.986 **
State sex ratio for black 0.220 0.199
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s 0.046 0.019 **
State expenditure on child support enforcement 0.023 0.011 **
State unemployment rate for male 0.006 0.019
State unemployment rate for female 0.009 0.025
State average annual pay in 0000s -0.027 0.065
State EITC credit rate for family of two children 0.008 0.004 **
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s 0.012 0.077
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s 0.062 0.181
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s -1.051 0.430 **
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.015 0.008 **
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.849 0.243 ***
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.122 0.067 *
State per-capita spirits consumption 0.009 0.090
State number of public library per thousand capita -0.970 0.548 *
Time trend 0.005 0.024
Time trend squared 0.002 0.008
Constant -3.693 0.194 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity 0.090 0.402
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.8: Estimation Results: Employment Status (full-year
part-time employed relative to full-year full-time)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.004 0.004
Cohabited in t-1 -0.328 0.114 ***
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 -0.012 0.019
Single in t-1 -0.461 0.062 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 -0.005 0.006
More than one marriage entering t -0.111 0.050 **
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.179 0.036 ***
Number of children above age 5 entering t 0.054 0.021 **
Aquire any children in t-1 0.235 0.068 ***
Lose any children in t-1 -0.093 0.083
Enrolled in t-1 -0.164 0.056 ***
Highest grade completed in t-1 -0.014 0.010
Out of labor force in t-1 2.562 0.077 ***
Unemployed in t-1 1.848 0.177 ***
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 3.501 0.067 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 1.224 0.066 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 4.560 0.042 ***
Years employed entering t -0.050 0.005 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 0.313 0.459
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 0.419 0.416
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.735 0.416 *
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.704 0.406 *
Black race -0.326 0.052 ***
Hispanic -0.199 0.057 ***
AFQT score in 00s -0.123 0.086
Age in years 0.051 0.015 ***
Age squared -0.002 0.005
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.034 0.007 ***
Rural residence 0.019 0.042
North central region -0.160 0.084 *
West region -0.209 0.132
South region -0.411 0.107 ***
State total population in hundred millions 0.097 0.405
State sex ratio for white -1.056 1.029
State sex ratio for black 0.262 0.211
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s 0.033 0.022
State expenditure on child support enforcement -0.023 0.011 **
State unemployment rate for male 0.012 0.022
State unemployment rate for female 0.046 0.028
State average annual pay in 0000s 0.141 0.071 **
State EITC credit rate for family of two children -0.005 0.005
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s -0.069 0.086
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s 0.388 0.202 *
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.288 0.515
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.009 0.009
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.603 0.253 **
State average teacher salary in 0000s -0.030 0.075
State per-capita spirits consumption 0.250 0.106 **
State number of public library per thousand capita 0.438 0.615
Time trend 0.037 0.029
Time trend squared -0.009 0.009
Constant -3.266 0.222 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -0.880 0.391 **
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.9: Estimation Results: Employment Status (part-year
full-time employed relative to full-year full-time employed)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.015 0.003 ***
Cohabited in t-1 0.112 0.074
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 -0.043 0.013 ***
Single in t-1 -0.286 0.044 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.003 0.004
More than one marriage entering t 0.083 0.037 **
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.048 0.029 *
Number of children above age 5 entering t 0.005 0.017
Aquire any children in t-1 -0.235 0.053 ***
Lose any children in t-1 0.122 0.058 **
Enrolled in t-1 0.022 0.041
Highest grade completed in t-1 -0.041 0.008 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 2.940 0.055 ***
Unemployed in t-1 2.612 0.102 ***
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 2.209 0.070 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 2.854 0.032 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 1.003 0.066 ***
Years employed entering t -0.050 0.004 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 -0.222 0.368
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 0.221 0.342
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.584 0.355
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.278 0.340
Black race 0.012 0.037
Hispanic -0.066 0.044
AFQT score in 00s -0.415 0.069 ***
Age in years -0.018 0.011
Age squared 0.007 0.004 *
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.007 0.006
Rural residence 0.021 0.034
North central region 0.014 0.070
West region 0.140 0.108
South region 0.017 0.086
State total population in hundred millions -0.330 0.323
State sex ratio for white -0.500 0.989
State sex ratio for black 0.359 0.174 **
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s -0.004 0.017
State expenditure on child support enforcement -0.007 0.010
State unemployment rate for male -0.009 0.017
State unemployment rate for female 0.035 0.021
State average annual pay in 0000s -0.025 0.059
State EITC credit rate for family of two children 0.012 0.004 ***
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s -0.082 0.068
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.221 0.161
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.411 0.402
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.011 0.007
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.123 0.213
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.133 0.060 **
State per-capita spirits consumption 0.014 0.081
State number of public library per thousand capita -0.508 0.520
Time trend 0.000 0.022
Time trend squared 0.010 0.007
Constant -2.278 0.175 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -4.165 0.348 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.10: Estimation Results: Employment Status (part-year
part-time employed relative to full-year full-time employed)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.022 0.005 ***
Cohabited in t-1 -0.271 0.128 **
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 -0.045 0.024 *
Single in t-1 -0.763 0.073 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.012 0.008
More than one marriage entering t -0.092 0.061
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.170 0.039 ***
Number of children above age 5 entering t -0.036 0.027
Aquire any children in t-1 -0.065 0.076
Lose any children in t-1 -0.275 0.118 **
Enrolled in t-1 -0.056 0.065
Highest grade completed in t-1 -0.053 0.013 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 4.311 0.078 ***
Unemployed in t-1 3.684 0.139 ***
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 5.295 0.072 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 2.316 0.076 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 3.337 0.073 ***
Years employed entering t -0.079 0.006 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 0.270 0.541
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 0.083 0.493
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.612 0.503
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.854 0.488 *
Black race -0.249 0.062 ***
Hispanic -0.114 0.069
AFQT score in 00s 0.120 0.108
Age in years 0.026 0.017
Age squared 0.000 0.007
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.036 0.009 ***
Rural residence -0.039 0.052
North central region -0.117 0.105
West region -0.222 0.163
South region -0.338 0.132 **
State total population in hundred millions -0.071 0.565
State sex ratio for white 1.356 1.097
State sex ratio for black 0.405 0.241 *
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s 0.011 0.026
State expenditure on child support enforcement -0.005 0.014
State unemployment rate for male -0.003 0.027
State unemployment rate for female 0.070 0.034 **
State average annual pay in 0000s 0.035 0.092
State EITC credit rate for family of two children 0.006 0.006
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s -0.095 0.110
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s 0.206 0.253
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.714 0.731
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.027 0.011 **
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.372 0.331
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.005 0.093
State per-capita spirits consumption 0.108 0.130
State number of public library per thousand capita -0.858 0.844
Time trend 0.008 0.033
Time trend squared 0.005 0.011
Constant -3.268 0.266 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -3.232 0.358 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.11: Estimation Results: Employment status (unemployed
relative to full-year full-time employed)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.020 0.007 ***
Cohabited in t-1 0.095 0.168
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 -0.020 0.023
Single in t-1 -0.025 0.107
Years single entering t if single in t-1 -0.010 0.007
More than one marriage entering t -0.082 0.088
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.137 0.060 **
Number of children above age 5 entering t -0.071 0.038 *
Aquire any children in t-1 0.167 0.109
Lose any children in t-1 -0.025 0.133
Enrolled in t-1 -0.101 0.100
Highest grade completed in t-1 -0.063 0.017 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 4.383 0.103 ***
Unemployed in t-1 5.804 0.119 ***
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 3.063 0.144 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 2.544 0.102 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 1.414 0.198 ***
Years employed entering t -0.078 0.007 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 -2.114 0.728 ***
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 1.814 0.682 ***
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.882 0.712
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.832 0.668
Black race 0.230 0.086 ***
Hispanic 0.003 0.107
AFQT score in 00s -1.330 0.179 ***
Age in years 0.106 0.023 ***
Age squared -0.024 0.008 ***
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.028 0.011 **
Rural residence 0.166 0.076 **
North central region 0.255 0.163
West region 0.189 0.256
South region 0.114 0.200
State total population in hundred millions -1.283 0.834
State sex ratio for white 0.558 1.885
State sex ratio for black -0.027 0.445
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s 0.058 0.038
State expenditure on child support enforcement -0.023 0.022
State unemployment rate for male 0.067 0.034 **
State unemployment rate for female 0.110 0.045 **
State average annual pay in 0000s 0.050 0.146
State EITC credit rate for family of two children -0.011 0.008
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s 0.084 0.154
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.536 0.375
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s 1.484 0.930
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.006 0.015
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.003 0.526
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.026 0.140
State per-capita spirits consumption 0.036 0.186
State number of public library per thousand capita -1.678 1.154
Time trend -0.014 0.048
Time trend squared 0.024 0.015 *
Constant -4.842 0.391 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -4.893 0.494 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.12: Estimation Results: Employment status (out of labor
force relative to full-year full-time employed)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.016 0.004 ***
Cohabited in t-1 -0.165 0.093 *
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 -0.015 0.015
Single in t-1 -0.524 0.054 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.005 0.005
More than one marriage entering t 0.003 0.045
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.206 0.031 ***
Number of children above age 5 entering t -0.131 0.020 ***
Aquire any children in t-1 0.229 0.056 ***
Lose any children in t-1 -0.163 0.074 **
Enrolled in t-1 -0.513 0.055 ***
Highest grade completed in t-1 -0.078 0.010 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 6.502 0.057 ***
Unemployed in t-1 4.550 0.101 ***
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 4.088 0.073 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 3.160 0.051 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 2.309 0.083 ***
Years employed entering t -0.124 0.004 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 -0.798 0.409 *
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 0.578 0.379
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.470 0.394
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.595 0.378
Black race -0.122 0.046 ***
Hispanic -0.155 0.053 ***
AFQT score in 00s -0.150 0.084 *
Age in years 0.062 0.013 ***
Age squared 0.004 0.005
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.031 0.007 ***
Rural residence 0.073 0.040 *
North central region -0.072 0.084
West region 0.042 0.129
South region -0.153 0.105
State total population in hundred millions -0.007 0.407
State sex ratio for white 0.028 1.059
State sex ratio for black 0.090 0.212
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s 0.013 0.021
State expenditure on child support enforcement -0.025 0.012 **
State unemployment rate for male 0.032 0.020
State unemployment rate for female 0.031 0.026
State average annual pay in 0000s 0.079 0.072
State EITC credit rate for family of two children -0.015 0.005 ***
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s -0.098 0.082
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.163 0.199
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.359 0.502
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.027 0.008 ***
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.202 0.260
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.080 0.072
State per-capita spirits consumption -0.040 0.100
State number of public library per thousand capita -0.803 0.657
Time trend 0.049 0.025 *
Time trend squared 0.000 0.008
Constant -2.901 0.208 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -2.754 0.464 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.13: Estimation Results: Family Size Change (gain any
children relative to no change)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 0.037 0.003 ***
Cohabited in t-1 0.636 0.098 ***
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 -0.015 0.011
Single in t-1 0.484 0.063 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.016 0.003 ***
More than one marriage entering t 0.481 0.040 ***
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.172 0.044 ***
Number of children above age 5 entering t 0.221 0.016 ***
Aquire any children in t-1 0.794 0.062 ***
Lose any children in t-1 0.908 0.045 ***
Enrolled in t-1 0.279 0.055 ***
Highest grade completed in t-1 -0.080 0.008 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 -0.273 0.052 ***
Unemployed in t-1 -0.033 0.111
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 -0.214 0.090 **
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 -0.011 0.051
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 -0.171 0.063 ***
Years employed entering t -0.024 0.003 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 -0.948 0.717
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 0.465 0.656
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 1.967 0.709 ***
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.400 0.640
Black race 0.204 0.045 ***
Hispanic 0.052 0.053
AFQT score in 00s -0.174 0.083 **
Age in years 0.191 0.020 ***
Age squared -0.035 0.005 ***
R’s mother highest grade completed -0.010 0.006 *
Rural residence 0.065 0.038 *
North central region 0.119 0.087
West region 0.137 0.133
South region 0.082 0.103
State total population in hundred millions -0.087 0.348
State sex ratio for white 0.363 0.990
State sex ratio for black 0.237 0.226
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s 0.016 0.022
State expenditure on child support enforcement 0.013 0.010
State unemployment rate for male -0.062 0.019 ***
State unemployment rate for female 0.049 0.026 *
State average annual pay in 0000s -0.055 0.066
State EITC credit rate for family of two children 0.002 0.005
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s 0.006 0.075
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s 0.247 0.177
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s 0.291 0.430
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.004 0.008
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.340 0.227
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.054 0.071
State per-capita spirits consumption -0.017 0.101
State number of public library per thousand capita 0.628 0.756
Time trend 0.035 0.033
Time trend squared -0.004 0.009
Constant -7.603 0.322 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -1.160 0.181 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
60
Table A.14: Estimation Results: Family Size Change (lose any
children relative to no change)
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.065 0.004 ***
Cohabited in t-1 -0.556 0.078 ***
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 -0.052 0.017 ***
Single in t-1 -1.403 0.046 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.021 0.006 ***
More than one marriage entering t -0.075 0.043 *
Number of children under age 5 entering t 0.144 0.024 ***
Number of children above age 5 entering t -0.166 0.022 ***
Aquire any children in t-1 -0.311 0.050 ***
Lose any children in t-1 0.957 0.063 ***
Enrolled in t-1 -0.424 0.052 ***
Highest grade completed in t-1 0.007 0.008
Out of labor force in t-1 0.292 0.045 ***
Unemployed in t-1 0.281 0.101 ***
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 0.162 0.069 **
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 0.187 0.045 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 0.137 0.055 **
Years employed entering t -0.005 0.005
Children’s average math score in t-1 -1.496 0.581 **
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 0.971 0.558 *
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 -0.619 0.516
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 0.623 0.503
Black race 0.233 0.041 ***
Hispanic 0.189 0.046 ***
AFQT score in 00s 0.109 0.073
Age in years -0.029 0.011 ***
Age squared 0.001 0.005
R’s mother highest grade completed -0.007 0.006
Rural residence -0.015 0.037
North central region 0.056 0.073
West region 0.018 0.115
South region -0.104 0.093
State total population in hundred millions 0.144 0.372
State sex ratio for white -2.337 0.984 **
State sex ratio for black -0.158 0.188
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s -0.018 0.018
State expenditure on child support enforcement -0.007 0.010
State unemployment rate for male 0.016 0.018
State unemployment rate for female -0.003 0.023
State average annual pay in 0000s -0.073 0.068
State EITC credit rate for family of two children -0.010 0.004 **
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s 0.034 0.079
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.377 0.186 **
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.452 0.441
State average pupil-teacher ratio 0.005 0.007
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.084 0.248
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.139 0.065 **
State per-capita spirits consumption 0.164 0.086 *
State number of public library per thousand capita 1.432 0.529 ***
Time trend -0.019 0.021
Time trend squared 0.007 0.007
Constant -0.937 0.173 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity 0.242 0.272
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Indicator
variables for missing values of some variables are not presented.
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Table A.15: Estimation Results: Investment in Child
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Child: math percentile score in t-1 0.013 0.008
Child: behavior prob percentile score in t-1 -0.074 0.008 ***
Years married entering t if married in t-1 0.530 0.044 ***
Cohabited in t-1 -2.996 0.849 ***
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 0.421 0.167 **
Single in t-1 -7.963 0.542 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 -0.143 0.077 *
More than one marriage entering t 1.692 0.461 ***
Number of children under age 5 entering t -2.702 0.252 ***
Number of children above age 5 entering t -2.011 0.194 ***
Aquire any children in t-1 -2.109 0.432 ***
Lose any children in t-1 -0.211 0.790
Enrolled in t-1 -0.337 0.490
Highest grade completed in t-1 1.446 0.096 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 2.359 0.414 ***
Unemployed in t-1 0.396 0.923
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 1.868 0.573 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 1.666 0.451 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 2.044 0.480 ***
Years employed entering t 0.185 0.046 ***
Child: girl 2.787 0.313 ***
Black race -8.682 0.492 ***
Hispanic -3.224 0.550 ***
AFQT score in 00s 9.916 0.864 ***
Age in years 1.055 0.133 ***
Age squared -0.466 0.058 ***
Child age 0.578 0.084 ***
Child age squared -0.039 0.009 ***
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.619 0.066 ***
Rural residence -0.809 0.372 **
North central region 0.285 0.754
West region 0.561 1.145
South region -0.166 0.954
State total population in hundred millions -9.531 3.317 ***
State sex ratio for white -10.028 8.743
State sex ratio for black 2.454 1.666
State AFDC/TANF per family of three in 00s 0.332 0.191 *
State expenditure on child support enforcement -0.166 0.105
State unemployment rate for male 0.167 0.186
State unemployment rate for female -0.819 0.226 ***
State average annual pay in 0000s 0.649 0.701
State EITC credit rate for family of two children -0.127 0.048 ***
State average 4-year private college tuition in 0000s 2.999 0.778 ***
State average 4-year public college tuition in 0000s 1.107 2.166
State average 2-year public college tuition in 0000s -0.142 3.944
State average pupil-teacher ratio -0.048 0.068
State expenditure per pupil in 0000s -2.017 2.387
State average teacher salary in 0000s 0.134 0.623
State per-capita spirits consumption -1.945 0.916 **
State number of public library per thousand capita 9.558 4.683 **
Time trend -2.131 0.218 ***
Time trend squared 0.517 0.077 ***
Constant -295.966 6.469 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity 107.328 4.735 ***
Child permanent heterogeneity 372.408 6.149 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of some
variables are not presented.
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Table A.16: Estimation Results: Log Wage
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 -0.005 0.001 ***
Cohabited in t-1 0.062 0.012 ***
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 0.000 0.002
Single in t-1 0.025 0.007 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 -0.001 0.001
More than one marriage entering t 0.025 0.007 ***
Number of children under age 5 entering t -0.014 0.005 ***
Number of children above age 5 entering t -0.014 0.003 ***
Aquire any children in t-1 0.018 0.009 **
Lose any children in t-1 0.004 0.011
Enrolled in t-1 -0.023 0.007 ***
Highest grade completed in t-1 0.056 0.002 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 -0.192 0.012 ***
Unemployed in t-1 -0.159 0.026 ***
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 -0.199 0.011 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 -0.112 0.007 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 -0.075 0.008 ***
Years employed entering t 0.022 0.001 ***
Children’s average math score in t-1 -0.031 0.060
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 -0.007 0.056
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.077 0.056
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.023 0.055
Black race -0.022 0.009 **
Hispanic 0.020 0.012 *
AFQT score in 00s 0.419 0.018 ***
Age in years 0.017 0.002 ***
Age squared -0.006 0.001 ***
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.004 0.001 ***
Rural residence -0.033 0.006 ***
North central region -0.021 0.011 *
West region 0.060 0.011 ***
South region 0.011 0.011
State unemployment rate for male 0.005 0.002 **
State unemployment rate for female -0.011 0.003 ***
State average annual pay in 0,000s 0.156 0.007 ***
State EITC credit rate for family of two children 0.000 0.001
Time trend -0.011 0.003 ***
Time trend squared -0.001 0.001
Constant 1.855 0.022 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity 5.682 0.093 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dol-
lar amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of
some variables are not presented.
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Table A.17: Estimation Results: Log of Spouse/Partner Income
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Years married entering t if married in t-1 0.006 0.001 ***
Cohabited in t-1 0.004 0.029
Years cohabited entering t if cohabited in t-1 0.007 0.007
Single in t-1 -0.079 0.027 ***
Years single entering t if single in t-1 0.019 0.009 **
More than one marriage entering t 0.089 0.014 ***
Number of children under age 5 entering t -0.012 0.009
Number of children above age 5 entering t -0.007 0.006
Aquire any children in t-1 -0.004 0.015
Lose any children in t-1 -0.012 0.023
Enrolled in t-1 -0.071 0.016 ***
Highest grade completed in t-1 0.047 0.003 ***
Out of labor force in t-1 0.247 0.015 ***
Unemployed in t-1 -0.016 0.043
Employed part-year part-time in t-1 0.201 0.021 ***
Employed part-year full-time in t-1 0.089 0.016 ***
Employed full-year part-time in t-1 0.176 0.016 ***
Years employed entering t -0.002 0.002
Children’s average math score in t-1 0.124 0.106
Children’s lowest math score in t-1 0.069 0.098
Children’s average BPI score in t-1 0.043 0.100
Children’s lowest BPI score in t-1 -0.131 0.098
Black race -0.243 0.018 ***
Hispanic -0.098 0.020 ***
AFQT score in 00s 0.372 0.030 ***
Age in years 0.037 0.004 ***
Age squared -0.007 0.001 ***
R’s mother highest grade completed 0.025 0.002 ***
Rural residence -0.074 0.012 ***
North central region 0.005 0.020
West region 0.007 0.020
South region -0.019 0.020
State unemployment rate for male -0.018 0.005 ***
State unemployment rate for female 0.005 0.007
State average annual pay in 0000s 0.154 0.014 ***
State EITC credit rate for family of two children -0.002 0.001 *
Time trend -0.002 0.006
Time trend squared -0.002 0.002
Constant 9.483 0.041 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity 8.229 0.155 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dol-
lar amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing values of
some variables are not presented.
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Table A.18: Estimation Results: Child PIAT Math Percentile Score
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Child: math percentile score in t-1 0.994 3.220 ***
Child: behavior prob percentile score in t-1 -0.010 0.004 **
Cohabit in t 1.911 0.004
Single in t 3.477 2.157 ***
Cohabit in t*child age -0.836 1.204
Single in t*child age -1.386 0.858 ***
Cohabit in t*child age squared 0.063 0.478
Single in t*child age squared 0.121 0.078 ***
Cohabit in t*child girl 0.018 0.044
Single in t*child girl 0.203 0.818
First year becoming single in t 0.191 0.466
Nonbiological dad in household in t 0.170 0.588
Cohabit*nonbiological dad in hh in t 0.891 0.290
Invest in child in t 0.014 0.883 ***
Invest in child in t*cohabit in t -0.015 0.004
Invest in child in t*single in t -0.002 0.012
Acquire any children in t -0.350 0.009
Lose any children in t 0.198 0.451
Enrolled in t -0.286 0.488
Out of labor force in t 0.062 0.278
Unemployed in t 0.449 0.222
Employed part-year part-time in t 0.352 0.757
Employed part-year full-time in t -0.256 0.468
Employed full-year part-time in t -0.275 0.278
Pupil-teacher ratio in t -0.049 0.285
Expenditure per pupil in 0000s -1.643 0.043
Teacher salary in 0000s 0.056 1.273
Child: girl -0.952 0.263 ***
Child: black race -0.051 0.231
Child: Hispanic 0.439 0.264
Child: age 0.319 0.270
Child: age squared -0.079 0.253 ***
AFQT score in 00s 1.389 0.023 ***
Highest grade completed -0.083 0.523 *
Age -0.010 0.050
Age squared 0.007 0.088
Rural residence 0.074 0.035
North central region -0.216 0.195
West region -0.452 0.424
South region -0.326 0.540
Time trend 0.260 0.505 ***
Time trend squared -0.077 0.085 **
Constant 13.535 1.782 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity -3.832 2.102 *
Child permanent heterogeneity -13.315 3.288 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dollar amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing
values of some variables are not presented.
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Table A.19: Estimation Results: Child Behavior Problems Index Percentile Score
Variable name Coeff Std Err
Child: math percentile score in t-1 0.000 0.000
Child: behavior prob percentile score in t-1 1.003 0.003 ***
Cohabit in t 0.848 1.520
Single in t 1.551 0.794 *
Cohabit in t*child age -0.468 0.631
Single in t*child age -0.721 0.331 **
Cohabit in t*child age squared 0.045 0.062
Single in t*child age squared 0.067 0.033 **
Cohabit in t*child girl 0.286 0.745
Single in t*child girl -0.234 0.334
First year becoming single in t -0.073 0.500
Nonbiological dad in household in t -0.227 0.272
Cohabit*nonbiological dad in hh in t 0.456 0.844
Invest in child in t -0.024 0.004 ***
Invest in child in t*cohabit in t -0.008 0.011
Invest in child in t*single in t -0.006 0.007
Acquire any children in t 0.773 0.343 **
Lose any children in t 0.048 0.444
Enrolled in t 0.146 0.255
Out of labor force in t 0.004 0.182
Unemployed in t 0.731 0.723
Employed part-year part-time in t 0.513 0.356
Employed part-year full-time in t 0.149 0.250
Employed full-year part-time in t -0.195 0.257
Pupil-teacher ratio in t 0.018 0.037
Expenditure per pupil in 0000s -0.879 1.175
Teacher salary in 0000s 0.139 0.229
Child: girl 0.090 0.189
Child: black race -0.566 0.232 **
Child: Hispanic -0.356 0.241
Child: age 0.604 0.199 ***
Child: age squared -0.060 0.019 ***
AFQT score in 00s 1.016 0.415 **
Highest grade completed 0.019 0.044
Age 0.017 0.078
Age squared -0.013 0.032
Rural residence -0.267 0.181
North central region -0.349 0.379
West region -0.224 0.484
South region -0.326 0.452
Time trend -0.001 0.111
Time trend squared 0.004 0.031
Constant -9.476 2.972 ***
Mother permanent heterogeneity 3.856 1.998 *
Child permanent heterogeneity 10.233 3.052 ***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dollar amounts are in year 2000 dollars. Indicator variables for missing
values of some variables are not presented.
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